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                                               Summary 
 
In this paper I defend my intuition that it is rational to take only one 
box in Newcomb’s problem. To establish this conclusion, I consider two 
different strategies. The first of these is an attempt to demonstrate the 
plausibility of reading the decision problem as one where, contrary to the 
common belief, it is the agent’s decision which causes the predictor to 
predict as he does and thus influences what the said box contains. Under 
this re-interpretation, it is obviously rational to take one box only.  
The second approach challenges the claim that in order to arrive at 
the rational decision, one needs to consider the causal influence of one’s 
actions on states of the world that might obtain. Arguing that such an 
assertion begs the question, I suggest against reading the conditional 
premises in decision making as counterfactuals. Instead, I contend that it is 
the agent’s decision-relevant degree of belief in a material conditional 
which grounds rational choice. The decision-relevant degree of belief in a 
material conditional consists, additively, of a non-trivial degree of belief in 
the same and a trivial degree of belief in it owing to an “independent 
chance” of the consequent of the material conditional being true. 
I report that an agent’s decision-relevant degree of belief in a 
material conditional happens also to equal, numerically, the agent’s value 
for the corresponding action-state conditional probability. In the light of this 
result, I show that two crucial inferences may be drawn. Firstly, that, for all 
 v
practical purposes, the use of  Evidential Decision Theory in guiding 
rational decision is justified and secondly, that, taking one box alone is the 












                                            1. Introduction 
1.1. The problem 
 
Newcomb’s paradox (or Newcomb’s problem) involves a being who 
has, or is believed to have, immaculate powers of predicting the choices that 
people make in certain situations. In an overwhelming majority of past 
instances (say, 99 out of every 100 times), he has correctly predicted the 
choices that people (including you) have made. You have no reason to 
believe that your current predicament is significantly different from any of 
these instances; thus, no reason to believe that he is less liable to have 
predicted your choice correctly this time round. You may tell yourself any 
story to support the stupendous (and perhaps infuriating) accuracy of his 
predictions; he could possess a phenomenal understanding of human 
behaviour and arrives at his predictions through past observations of one’s 
behaviour, or he could be a supremely gifted neurobiologist who infers the 
way one will choose by extrapolating from neuron firing patterns in one’s 
brain, or even a brilliant genetic scientist who bases his predictions of one’s 
choices based on one’s genetic makeup. 
 Your present dilemma is this. Before you are two boxes, one opaque, 
the other transparent: name them A and B respectively. You may choose to 
take A alone, or else you may take both A and B, in the knowledge that you 
will get whatever is contained in the box (or boxes) that you take. In B, you 
can clearly see a crisp thousand dollar bill. You also know that A contains 
either a cheque for a million dollars or a worthless sheet of foolscap, but 
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you do not know which. You are however given this crucial information: if 
the predictor has predicted that you will take A alone, then he has already 
put a cheque for a million dollars in A; but if his prediction is that you will 
take both A and B, then he has left the sheet of foolscap in A. Now, you 
know that the predictor has indeed made one of these predictions some time 
in the past (say, a week back), suitably enriched A, sealed it and left. You 
know that A has not since been tampered with, i.e., you know that if the 
predictor has put the million in A, it is there now and similarly for the sheet 
of foolscap. Now, one week after the prediction, what should you do so that 
you go home richest? Should you take A alone or should you take both A 
and B? It is assumed that you will not decline to choose, or toss a coin to 
decide, or otherwise shirk from thinking your way through the problem as 
described. 
1.2. The positions 
Chances are that you will think the problem innocuous enough to 
have an obvious answer. Herein is the paradox: intuition seems equally 
strong in favour of taking A alone, as well as taking both A and B. What is 
more, arguments of apparently equal persuasiveness can be mounted in 
favour of both decisions. Thus, you may reason in the following manner. If 
I take A alone, the predictor is extremely likely to have predicted this, 
whereupon he would have put the million dollars in A. I would then be 
better off to the tune of a million dollars. Likewise, if I take both A and B, 
the predictor is, once again, likely to have predicted this, and so would have 
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placed the sheet of foolscap in A. In this case I would go home merely a 
thousand dollars richer. Clearly then, I should take only A. Or, so you 
reason and, just as you are about to walk away after taking A, up steps the 
two-boxer (one who advocates that you should take both boxes) urging you 
to reconsider your decision. The two-boxer says: Either the predictor has 
predicted that you would take A alone or he has predicted that you would 
take both boxes. Accordingly, he has either put a million dollars into A or 
nothing at all. Now, the content of A (whether a million or zero) has been 
fixed for a week now, i.e., if there are a million dollars in the box, then the 
money has now been lying there for a week; whereas if the box has only the 
sheet of foolscap in it, then the box has been money-less for the same 
duration of time. Your action will not cause the million to appear in A if it 
is not already there, nor miraculously vanish if it is already there. So 
shouldn’t you take both boxes? Whether there is a million or nothing in A, 
you stand to gain a thousand dollars more either way, compared to what you 
would get if you were to take only A. Now you are in a quandary. There 
seem to be equally compelling arguments in favour of both taking only A 
and taking both boxes. 
 Additional arguments can be given to drum up intuitive support for 
the two positions and to deepen your perplexity. The two-boxer asks you to 
suppose that your best friend (a rational, sincere well-wisher) is sitting on 
the other side of the boxes and can see clearly what each box contains. 
Since he has all the information about the game and your best interests at 
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heart, it surely would be rational to follow his advice regarding how you 
should act. Now, he cannot communicate his advice to you; nevertheless 
you know that if he were allowed to do so, he would, notwithstanding what 
he sees in A, advise you to pick both boxes in the hope of getting the extra 
thousand dollars. Is it not then foolhardy to take only A, against the advice 
of a sincere, rational well-wisher possessing complete information? 
 The one-boxer, on the other hand, asks you to imagine yourself in a 
betting situation. If you take A alone, it surely would be rational for you to 
bet with a third person that you would pocket a million dollars, given, we 
may assume, the extremely high incidence of such behaviour being 
similarly rewarded in the past. On the other hand, if you decide to take both 
boxes, it would be rational for you to bet, on similar grounds, that you will 
merely make a thousand dollars. Is it not irrational to perform the act for 
which it would be rational to bet that you will get less money? Looked at in 
this light, it seems rational to take Box A alone. 
1.3. Theoretical justifications for both alternatives 
 Newcomb’s problem, in addition to being a fascinating mind-bender, 
is archetypal of cases that lead to a theoretical divide regarding what 
considerations are crucial to making a rational decision.1 To see what this 
                                                
1Other “Newcomb cases” are Ronald Fisher’s smoking-cancer example and Gibbard and Harper’s 
Solomon example. Fisher imagines a gene which causes its possessor both to smoke and to 
develop lung cancer. Interestingly, smoking itself never causes lung cancer; the gene is the 
common cause of both smoking and lung cancer. As such, it is observed that most smokers 
develop lung cancer while most non-smokers remain free of the disease. If one likes smoking but 
would also give it up on pain of developing lung cancer, would it be rational, knowing what Fisher 
imagines above, to smoke? (See Horgan 1981, 352.) 
   Gibbard and Harper consider Solomon, who is contemplating whether or not to bed another 
man’s wife (an “unjust” act). Just kings have been observed to have enjoyed long and prosperous 
reigns, while the rules of unjust kings are often cut short by violent revolts. However, it is known 
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means, let us formalise the arguments behind taking A alone and taking 
both A and B, in order to contextualise both decisions within their 
appropriate theoretical frameworks. 
1.4. Evidential Decision Theory 
Theoretical support for a decision to take A alone traditionally comes 
from a principle of rational decision-making which we may call, after 
current fashion, Evidential Decision Theory (EDT). In a decision-context, 
let A be a set of n possible actions, exactly one of which the agent must 
choose to perform. Let S be a set of k possible states (of the world), exactly 
one of which the agent is bound to find himself in, whatever he does: 
A = {A1, A2, A3, …, Ai,…, An} 
S = {S1, S2, S3, ….., Sj,…, Sk} 
For any i and j, let U(Ai, Sj) be a numerical measure of the “utility” the 
agent derives from being in state Sj, having performed Ai. The point of EDT 
is to formulate the following numerical measure, EU(Ai), for any action Ai, 
called the expected utility of Ai: 
EU(Ai) = ∑j P(Sj/Ai) • U(Ai, Sj) 2 
According to EDT, the rational agent chooses the course of action which 
has the highest expected utility. (If two or more actions tie in having 
identical “highest” expected utilities, then the rational agent should be 
indifferent between performing any of them.) 
                                                                                                                                 
that a monarch’s behaviour per se never precipitates a revolt; rather it is a certain personal 
charisma which jointly causes both a king to be just and his rule to be revolt-free. Solomon would 
love to have the lady in bed only so far as he can rule peacefully and for longer. Should he dare 
commit the patently unjust act in question? (Gibbard and Harper 1978, 141). 
2 For the agent’s beliefs to be consistent, it is traditionally required that ∑j P(Sj/Ai) = 1. 
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 The intuition behind EDT is straightforward. The expected utility 
function may be imagined to measure the “desirability” to the agent of 
performing the various actions under its scope. Now, if the agent is certain 
that a particular state Sj will transpire upon the performance of action Ai, 
then the desirability of performing Ai, as measured by EU(Ai), will clearly 
just be the utility value U(Ai, Sj). However, in a typical decision-context, the 
agent knows only that exactly one of the states S1, S2, …, Sk will transpire 
upon the performance of Ai, but not which one. Since the conditional 
probability P(Sj/Ai) may be thought of as measuring the agent’s degree of 
belief that Sj will transpire upon the performance of Ai, the expected utility 
function enables the agent to construct a desirability measure for Ai by 
calculating the weighted average of the utilities of the states S1, S2, …, Sk, 
using the conditional probabilities as weights. The requirement to perform 
the act with the highest desirability value then suggests itself. 
 In Newcomb’s problem, there are two possible actions (take A alone; 
take both boxes), and two possible states which might, either way, transpire 
(A contains a million; it contains nothing). A belief in the predictor’s 
powers leads the agent to have these conditional probabilities (say): 
P(A contains $1M/Take A alone) = 0.99 
P(A contains $0/Take A alone) = 0.01 
P(A contains $1M/Take both) = 0.01 
P(A contains $0/Take both) = 0.993 
                                                
3 ‘M’ abbreviates ‘million’ while ‘K’ (shortly below) abbreviates ‘thousand’. The value 0.99 
captures the predictor’s accuracy, as measured between 0 and 1. A number like 0.9 will also do. 
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The agent may now calculate the expected utility of taking A alone, as well 
as that of taking both boxes: 
EU(Take A alone) = P(A contains $1M/ Take A alone) • ($1M) + P(A 
contains $0/ Take A alone) • ($0) 
= 0.99 • $1M + 0.01 • $0 
= $990,000. 
EU(Take both) = P(A contains $1M/ Take both) • ($1M+$1K) + P(A 
contains $0/ Take both) • ($1K)     
= 0.01 • ($1M+$1K) + 0.99 • $1K 
= $11,000.4 
Since EU(Take A alone) exceeds EU(Take both), or, in other words, since 
taking A alone is more “desirable” to the agent than taking both boxes, the 
rational thing to do, according to EDT, is to take A alone.5 
1.5. Jeffrey Dominance 
 In contrast, the traditional principle on which a theoretical 
recommendation to take both boxes rests is that of Dominance. To see how 
dominance-based considerations impact on decision-making, imagine two 
actions A1 and A2 being available to the agent, along with two possible 
                                                
4We assume that the agent is risk-neutral. In lay terms, relative to the present calculation, we 
assume that the agent cares only about money and that his utility for money is measured linearly in 
dollars. These assumptions are untenable in general but may be stipulated into the problem for 
convenience. 
5It is easy to show, given the assumption in the previous note, that as long as the predictor’s 
accuracy is at least 50.05%, EDT recommends taking A alone as rational! (We assumed a 99% 
accuracy in the calculation above.) 
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(exclusive and exhaustive) states of the world, S1 and S2 that might transpire 






As before, U(Ai,Sj) represents the utility to the agent of the relevant act-state 
combination. For example, U(A1,S2) is the utility the agent derives from 
being in S2, having performed A1. 
 One action is said to weakly dominate the other if and only if the 
utility derived from the former is at least as high as the utility derived from 
the latter, no matter what state of the world obtains. For example, A1 weakly 
dominates A2 if and only if U(A1,S1) ≥ U(A2, S1) and U(A1,S2) ≥ U(A2,S1). 
 The principle of Dominance recommends the performance of that 
action which weakly dominates all others.7 The intuition behind this sort of 
reasoning is equally clear. If, while deciding whether or not to carry an 
umbrella, you know that it is either going to rain heavily or be extremely 
sunny (and not both) and that, regardless of which, you are better off in the 
company of an umbrella than not, then it is clearly rational for you to carry 
an umbrella. Two caveats, however, must be made explicit with respect to 
                                                
6The number of actions and states have been limited for ease of exposition. For a more general 
treatment, see Nozick 1969. 
7It is possible that no action weakly dominates all others. In that case, the principle provides no 
guidance as to what the agent should do. If more than one action weakly dominates all others, 
indifference between performing them is recommended. 
 S1 S2 
A1 U(A1,S1) U(A1,S2) 
A2 U(A2,S1) U(A2,S2) 
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the applicability of the principle in decision-contexts. A weakly dominant 
action must in the first place exist, whereas not all, in fact very few, 
decision-contexts satisfy this condition. So the principle does not have an 
universal scope, although it proves to apply to Newcomb’s problem. Second 
(and this will caveat be debated in a while), the principle is justified if and 
only if the various states which might obtain are probabilistically 
independent of the various actions being considered.8 I will hereafter refer 
to this as the Jeffrey Criterion on the principle, after Richard Jeffrey (See 
Jeffrey 1965). Both conditions are met in the example just discussed. 
 To see how Dominance might apply to Newcomb’s problem, let us 
construct the relevant matrix: 
 
 
                                                
8A state S is probabilistically independent of an action A just in case P(S/A) = P(S). Bar-Hillel and 
Margalit (1978, 296-7) provide the following example to motivate this criterion: “Israel must 
decide whether to withdraw from its occupied territories or not, and Egypt must decide whether to 
declare war on Israel or not. Suppose the following matrix represents the possible payoffs to Israel 
on some ordinal utility scale. 
 
 War Peace 
Withdraw 0 2 
Remain 1 3 
 
Clearly, remaining in the occupied territories is the dominant strategy, since 1 > 0 and 3 > 2. 
Suppose, however, that you believe that with a high probability withdrawal will be conducive to 
peace while remaining in the territories will eventually lead to war. Then you might prefer to 
withdraw and end up in the 2 cell than to remain and end up in the 1 cell.” 
 A contains $1M A contains $0 
Take A alone $1M $0 
Take both $1M + $1K $K 
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It is apparent that taking both boxes dominates taking A alone. 
Nevertheless, it is open to question whether this establishes that taking both 
boxes is the rational action, since the Jeffrey Criterion proves to be violated. 
Newcomb’s problem (indeed, all “common-cause” problems like it, 
including the smoking-cancer and Solomon problems above) is 
characterised by a probabilistic dependence of the states in question on the 
actions under consideration. Having no idea what is in box A, it is 
reasonable to assign P(A contains $M) = P(A contains $0) = 0.5. But, as 
previously mentioned, it may be that, say, P(A contains $M/I take A alone) 
= 0.99. So P(A contains $M/I take A alone) ≠ P(A contains $M) and thus 
the state of A containing $M is not probabilistically independent of my 
decision to take A alone, and likewise for the other cases. So the legitimacy 
of applying  Jeffrey Dominance to Newcomb-like problems is questionable. 
1.6. Nozick Dominance 
Notwithstanding the above, there remains a strong intuitive feeling that 
using Dominance to arrive at the rational decision in Newcomb’s problem 
is sound. Whether there is a million dollars or nothing (=foolscap) in Box A 
has been “fixed” for a week now, since the predictor made his prediction 
and accordingly put either the cheque or the sheet of foolscap in A last 
week, and A has not since been tampered with. Thus even though you do 
not know whether you are in a world where A contains a million or in a 
world where A contains nothing, you know that you are now, at the point of 
making your decision, in exactly one of these worlds and that you cannot by 
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your decision change which one it is. In other words, a decision to take A 
alone will not cause the cheque to miraculously appear in A if it is not 
already there, nor, equally miraculously, be replaced by the sheet of 
foolscap if it is already there. The same holds true for a decision to take 
both boxes. Thus, the state of the world you are in is causally independent 
of your action. It seems intuitively appealing, in this way, to make your 
decision keeping the “fixity” of the content of A in mind. From this point of 
view, you are correctly applying Dominance in reasoning thus: 
(1) Either A contains $1M or it contains nothing. 
(2) If it contains $1M, I will get $1K more if I take both boxes than if I 
take A alone. 
(3) If it contains nothing, I will (still) get $1K more if I take both boxes 
than if I take A alone. 
(4) Hence, regardless of whether there is $1M or nothing in A, I will get 
$1K more if I take both boxes than if I take A alone 
and are rational, if you resolve to take both boxes on this basis. Needless to 
mention, there is an implicit premise in the argument just given, which is 
that the state (of the box) is causally independent of whatever you do, as we 
have been discussing. 
 The moral that Nozick draws from considering Newcomb’s problem 
(and other common-cause problems like it) is that the Jeffrey Criterion, 
which restricts the application of Dominance to decision-making contexts 
where the states are probabilistically independent of the actions, is 
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misguided. Rather, a more sensible restriction on the scope of Dominance 
concerns the causal independence of the states and the actions in question. 
According to Nozick, Dominance is legitimately applied in a decision-
context if and only if no action available to the agent is such that its 
performance will cause some state of the world under consideration to 
materialise. (See Nozick 1969, 63.) This condition, call it Nozick 
Dominance, is clearly satisfied in Newcomb’s problem. 
 Notice that, in the umbrella example, the possible states of heavy 
rain or bright sunshine were both probabilistically and causally independent 
of the possible actions of carrying an umbrella or otherwise.9 In this case, as 
in many everyday decision-contexts, both Jeffrey and Nozick agree that 
Dominance is correctly applied, whenever it is applicable. The dispute 
arises when there is probabilistic dependence between the states and the 
actions in question along with causal independence, as in cases where the 
states and the actions have a single common cause. In Newcomb’s Problem, 
for example, the agent’s genetic makeup (say) causes the agent to act in a 
certain way, as well as causes the predictor to predict in a certain way (and 
thus to fix the state of box A in a certain way). The common causation here 
ensures that the agent’s action is causally independent of the state of box A, 
as well as that it is probabilistically dependent upon it.10 
                                                
9Your decision whether or not to carry an umbrella will not cause the weather to turn out a certain 
way, nor will it make it any more or less likely that it will rain /be sunny. 
10That the states and actions have a common cause does not entail a causal dependence between 
them. In Nozick’s sense, there is such causal dependence if and only if the action causes (or is apt 
to cause) the state in question to obtain. So the existence of a common cause for the states and the 
actions actually confers a causal independence between them, assuming that there is no issue of 
causal overdetermination of the states in question. Also, it is widely allowed that causal 
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If Nozick is right to enlarge the scope of Dominance in the way that 
he suggests, and there seems to be intuitive merit to his view, then we have 
two intuitively correct principles of decision-making that prescribe, in 
Newcomb’s problem, different courses of action as rational. The principle 
of EDT, which we may call the Expected Utility Principle recommends that 
it is rational to take A alone, since that maximizes the expected utility to the 
agent. On the other hand, Nozick Dominance reckons that since you cannot 
causally affect the state of box A no matter what you do, and that you are a 
thousand dollars better off by taking both boxes, it is rational for you to take 
both boxes.11 
                                                                                                                                 
dependence implies probabilistic dependence, but not vice versa. If so, then causal dependence is 
compatible with probabilistic dependence, but not with probabilistic independence. However, see 
Gibbard and Harper for a supposed case of the latter, which I do not find very convincing (1978, 
140-2). An example of a decision-context in which neither Jeffrey- nor Nozick-Dominance is 
applicable is Bar-Hillel and Margalit’s Egypt-Israel example in note 8 above. 
11 In an ordinary decision problem (i.e., without “common causation”), the Expected Utility 
Principle, Jeffrey Dominance and Nozick Dominance all concur, so far as I know. Consider the 
umbrella example, where the states are probabilistically and causally independent of the actions: 
 
 Heavy rain Bright sunshine 
Carry umbrella a b 
Don’t carry c d 
 
For simplicity, assume that a > c and b > d, where a, b, c, d > 0, so that both Jeffrey- and Nozick-
Dominance recommend carrying the umbrella. Suppose further that P(Heavy rain) = p and that 
P(Bright sunshine) = 1−p. Then: 
 
P(Heavy rain/Carry umbrella) = P(Heavy rain/Don’t carry) = P(Heavy rain) = p 




EU(Carry umbrella) = pa + (1-p)c = p(a-c) + c 




EU(Carry umbrella) - EU(Don’t carry) = p(a+b) + p(a-c) + p(b-d) + c + d > 0 
 
So the Expected Utility Principle also recommends carrying an umbrella. 
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1.7. Causal Decision Theory 
We have just examined a dispute concerning the proper scope of 
applying dominance considerations to decision-contexts, and have 
tentatively agreed to resolve it in one way (Nozick’s). I now consider an 
analogous dispute concerning the proper way of calculating expected utility.  
In the traditional calculation outlined previously, the action-state 
conditional probabilities were used as weights for calculating the average 
utility derivable from performing an action in a decision-context. Nozick 
suggests, however, that this weighting is flawed as the conditional 
probability of a state given an action, for short, P(S/A), does not capture the 
agent’s degree of belief that performing the action will bring about the state 
in question; such a conditional probability value does not, in general, track 
the causal efficacy of performing an action. Rather, it merely measures the 
agent’s confidence that he is in state S on the assumption that he performs A. 
According to Nozick, the measure of utility that the agent calculates using 
the conditional probabilities as weights does not thus help him choose 
between alternative courses of action, in being blind to the fact that the 
agent does what he does in the hope of thereby bringing about a desired 
state. Instead, Nozick claims that expected utility, as traditionally-calculated, 
measures the welcomeness to the agent of the news that he has performed 
the action in question, in other words, the “news value” of the action. (See 
Nozick 1969, 60-1.) 
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 Gibbard and Harper (1978) have pursued Nozick’s suggestion to 
some depth and have formulated an alternative method of computing the 
“genuine” expected utility of an action, “properly” relevant to decision-
contexts. Following Nozick, they do not use conditional probabilities as 
weights, agreeing that a conditional-probability-aided calculation of the 
expected utility of an action represents merely the “cheer factor” of the 
news to the agent that he has performed the action. If one chooses an action 
with the highest cheer factor or news value, then, according to Gibbard and 
Harper, one is not really choosing the action with the highest expected 
utility. Rather, one is (fallaciously) discerning the rational act on the basis 
of how happy one will be given evidence that the action is performed, 
compared to evidence that some other action is performed. 
 To calculate the “genuine” measure of expected utility, Gibbard and 
Harper favour replacing the traditional weights (the act-state conditional 
probabilities) with weights of another sort: unconditional probabilities of 
act-state counterfactuals. Consider again the umbrella example. A 
traditional expected-utility calculation would be this: 
EU(Carry umbrella) = P(Heavy rain/Carry umbrella) • a + P(Bright 
sunshine/Carry umbrella) • c 
EU(Don’t carry) = P(Heavy rain/Don’t carry) • b + P(Bright 
sunshine/Don’t carry) • d 
with the conditional probabilities as weights, and a, b, c, d as in note 11 
above. Gibbard and Harper suggest this expected-utility calculation instead: 
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EU(Carry umbrella) = P(Carry umbrella □→ Heavy rain) • a + P(Carry 
umbrella □→ Bright sunshine) • c 
EU(Don’t carry) = P(Don’t carry □→ Heavy rain) • b + P(Don’t carry 
□→ Bright sunshine) • d 
with unconditional probabilities of counterfactuals as weights.12 The 
rational agent then performs the action with the highest expected utility, as 
before. 
The replacement of conditional probabilities with unconditional 
probabilities of counterfactuals reflects the intuitive desire to accommodate 
the causal efficacy of the action in question, relative to the various states 
under consideration. Gibbard and Harper contend that it is an action-state 
counterfactual A □→ S which properly accommodates the existence of a 
causal relation between A and S. In a decision-context, where the agent is 
concerned with the likelihood of A bringing about S, they contend further 
that A □→ S is true if and only if either A causes S to obtain or S obtains 
anyway. More generally, they hold that: 
P(A □→ S) = P(A causes S) + P(S obtains anyway)13 
                                                
12 The notation ‘A □→ S’ is to be read as a counterfactual conditional, ‘If it were the case that A is 
performed, then it would be the case that S obtains’. 
13 In their words (Gibbard and Harper 1978, 139): “A state S is unavoidable iff for every act A* 
open to the agent, A* □→ S holds. Thus A □→ S holds iff S is a consequence of A or S is 
unavoidable. Hence in particular, for any outcome O, 
 




Now, there are cases where it is of no import whether we use the traditional 
weights to calculate expected utility, or the weights favoured by Gibbard 
and Harper. Thus, in the umbrella example: 
P(Carry umbrella □→ Heavy rain)  
= P(Carry umbrella causes heavy rain) + P(Heavy rain anyway)  
= 0 + P(Heavy rain anyway)  
= P(Heavy rain)  
= P(Heavy rain/Carry umbrella), owing to probabilistic independence. 
Similarly: 
P(Don’t carry □→ Heavy rain) = P(Heavy rain) 
= P(Heavy rain/Don’t carry) 
P(Carry umbrella □→ Bright sunshine) = P(Bright sunshine) 
= P(Bright sunshine/Carry umbrella) 
P(Don’t carry □→ Bright sunshine) = P(Bright sunshine) 
= P(Bright sunshine/Don’t carry). 
However, in Newcomb’s problem (and ones like it), it makes a big 
difference which weights are used, as I will show below. The Expected 
Utility Principle is thus ambiguous between a principle that advises one to 
maximise traditionally-calculated expected utility (that advises “V-
maximisation”, in Gibbard and Harper’s terms) and a principle that advises 
one to maximise expected utility as Gibbard and Harper propose to 
calculate it (that advises “U-maximisation”). Let us refer to Gibbard and 
Harper’s theory as Causal Decision Theory (CDT), also following current 
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fashion. It has already been shown that EDT recommends taking A alone in 
Newcomb’s problem. I now show that CDT makes the contrary 
recommendation to take both boxes. 
 To calculate the expected utility of taking A alone, and that of taking 
both boxes, in the fashion of CDT, we need to evaluate the (unconditional) 
probabilities of the following counterfactuals: 
1) Take A alone □→ A contains $1M 
2) Take A alone □→ A contains $0                                            
3) Take both □→ A contains $1M 
4) Take both □→ A contains $0 
As previously explained: 
P(Take A alone □→ A contains $1M)  
= P(Take A alone causes A contains $1M) + P(A contains $1M anyway)  
The first additive component is 0, since the agent knows that taking A alone 
does not cause it to contain $1M. Now, assume some arbitrary value q for 
the agent’s probability that A contains $1M anyway. Then: 
P(A contains $1M anyway) = q 
P(A contains $0 anyway) = 1− q 
and so, generalizing to the other cases as well: 
P(Take A alone □→ A contains $1M) = q  
P(Take A alone □→ A contains $0) = 1− q 
P(Take both □→ A contains $M) = q 
P(Take both □→ A contains $0) = 1− q 
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 The desired expected utilities are then: 
EU(Take A alone) = P(Take A alone □→ A contains $M) • ($1M) + 
P(Take A alone □→ A contains $0) • ($0) 
= q • $1,000,000 
EU(Take both) = P(Take both □→ A contains $M) •  ($1M + $1K) + 
P(Take both □→ A contains $0) • ($1K) 
= q • 1,001,000 + (1−q) • $1000 
= q • $1,000,000 + $1000 
Since the latter value exceeds the former by $1,000, no matter what q is, 
CDT, unlike EDT, recommends taking both boxes. 
1.8. Conclusion 
 The following matrix summarises the recommendations of the 













independence Take A alone 




independence Take both boxes 
Nozick Dominance Causal independence Take both boxes 
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 Personally, I think it rational to take A alone in Newcomb’s problem, 
and will hope to establish this in the following pages. 
In Chapter 2, I provide an interpretation of Newcomb’s problem on 
which EDT and CDT do not conflict, nor even EDT and Nozick Dominance. 
On this interpretation, Newcomb’s problem is not a “common-cause” 
problem, as might first appear, and taking A alone is the correct decision. 
Chapter 3 discusses more fully the two boxers’ insistence of taking 
causal dependencies between actions and states into account, in decision-
contexts. I argue that this insistence is not well-founded. 
In Chapter 4, I provide an alternative principle to EDT of justifying 
the wisdom of taking A alone. Like EDT, my principle makes no reference 
to causal considerations. Nonetheless, I claim that this principle has a 
stronger intuitive basis than EDT does. 
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2. Forward causation and Newcomb’s paradox 
2.1. The forward causation problem 
 I consider here a crucial feature of the paradox, namely, the 
predictor’s high degree of accuracy. I try to present a plausible account of 
how decisions are generally made which accommodates the possibility of 
the predictor’s accuracy. If the story I suggest is correct, then Newcomb’s 
paradox, in its original form,  is misdescribed as being a “common-cause” 
case. This allows for a simple, shortcut method of resolving the paradox. 
 Consider first a modified version of the problem, the forward 
causation version. In this version, you decide whether to take A alone or 
both boxes and then communicate your decision to the predictor (e.g., you 
simply tell him what you will do). If he learns, via your communication, 
that you will take A alone, then he puts a million dollars in A, whereas if he 
learns that you will take both boxes, then he leaves A empty. As in the 
original version, B always contains a thousand dollars. Once the predictor 
has acted, you take the box or boxes that you have decided to take. Should 
you decide to take A alone or both boxes? 
This version of the problem presents no dilemma. You should 
obviously decide to take A alone. In terms of the decision principles 
discussed in Chapter 1, note that this decision-context is characterised by 
forward causation (i.e., normal causation, not backwards causation, if there 
is such a thing). The agent’s decision to take A alone (or both boxes) causes 
the predictor to put a million in Box A (or leave A empty). So we have both 
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probabilistic and causal dependence between the actions and the states in 
question, and neither Jeffrey Dominance nor Nozick Dominance may be 
applied.14 
Likewise, we expect no clash between EDT and CDT. For consider 
first that if the counterfactuals ‘Take A alone □→ A contains $M’ and 
‘Take both □→ A contains $0’ have a probability greater than 50.05%, then 
CDT recommends taking A alone.15 In the case described above, these 
probabilities may simply be stipulated to satisfy this condition. And since 
the probabilistic dependence between the agent’s actions and the state of 
box A derives directly from the causal dependence between them, the 
conditional probabilities, P(A contains $M/Take A alone) and P(A contains 
$0/Take both) will also clearly be higher than 50.05%. So, in this case, EDT 
and CDT both recommend taking A alone.16 
                                                
14 The probabilistic dependence in this circumstance owes to the causal dependence. 
15 Assume that P(Take A alone □→ A contains $M) = q. Then P(Take both □→ A contains $0) = q 
as well, for you have the same sets of reasons for believing these counterfactuals. Also, P(Take A 
alone □→ A contains $0) = P(Take both □→ A contains $M) = 1-q. Then: 
 
EU(Take A alone)  
= P(Take A alone □→ A contains $M) • $M + P(Take A alone □→ A contains $0) • $0 
= q • $M + (1−q) • $0  





= (1−q) • ($M + $K) + q • $K 
= 1,001,000 − q • $1,000,000 
 
For EU(Take A alone) > EU(Take both): 
       
1,000,000q > 1,001,000 − 1,000,000q 
q > 0.5005. 
 
16 I noted previously (Chapter 1, note 5) that if P(A contains $M/Take A alone) and P(A contains 
$0/Take both) > 50.05%, then EDT recommends taking A alone. 
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The version of the problem just described is rather trivial. However, I 
draw attention to it here because my attempt in this chapter at resolving the 
original problem hinges upon claiming that it involves a cleverly 
camouflaged instance of forward causation, so that the original problem is 
in a sense identical to the trivial problem just described. I believe this to be 
borne out of a careful consideration of how the predictor manages to be so 
accurate. I will articulate a model of decision-making which affords a 
plausible explanation of the predictor’s accuracy, while revealing crucial 
parallels between the original problem and the forward causation version 
just discussed. The model I will put forth does not hold of every decision-
context; it suffices if it is a reasonable characterisation of Newcomb’s 
problem. 
2.2. Newcomb’s problem reinterpreted 
There are many instances where an agent is known to be predisposed 
to act in some way in a decision-context. The source of such predispositions 
is tangential to the discussion here; some conceivable tale involving genetic 
structures, psychological factors, etc. might be told. Thus, my Muslim 
friend Iqbal’s strong aversion to eating pork takes the form of a 
predisposition to avoid ordering pork-based meals when presented with a 
menu for dinner. Someone could also be predisposed towards wearing a 
particular colour of dress, or a particular type of dress. on certain occasions, 
if not always, or inclined to make journeys via land rather than by air, or to 
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have a vacation in the hills rather than by the sea, or to want coffee after 
dinner rather than tea; the list is endless. 
 Now, the agent is often aware of such predispositions on her part. 
Iqbal, for instance, knows that he shies away from pork, and I myself am 
aware of a predisposition on my part to avoid crowds, as manifested by 
going to the movies on weekdays or to the gym during off-peak hours. 
However, the agent may also have a tendency to act in a certain way 
without being aware of it. Suppose you are intimate with your friend’s taste 
in books. You have visited her house many times, browsed through her 
library several times over, accompanied her on numerous book-buying trips. 
Based on your observations, you know the specific genre of the books she is 
likely to purchase, say, Victorian detective fiction. Nevertheless, the next 
time you go to a bookshop with her, were you to predict that she would pick 
up a Victorian murder mystery, it is not inconceivable that your prediction 
be received with puzzlement and even vehemently (and sincerely) rejected. 
Later, after your prediction has been vindicated, as the case may be, if you 
ask her to square her pre-purchase bafflement with the fact that she indeed 
did as you predicted, and that her bookcase is overwhelmingly dominated 
with such titles, she might indeed concede that she is predisposed towards 
reading period whodunits. It seems quite possible in this way that she 
lacked any awareness of this predisposition beforehand. My point is that 
there are decision-making contexts where, even though the agent has an 
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inclination to act in some specific manner, he has no inkling of this prior to 
deciding, or even subsequently. 
 It seems possible to discern two different senses of the word 
‘predisposition’ or ‘disposition’. In a weak sense (this appears to be the 
ordinary sense), an agent’s disposition to act in a certain manner reflects her 
initial pre-deliberative tendencies to act in that way. In the example above, 
this weak sense was intended, and in this sense, we are not “compelled” to 
act in accordance with our dispositions. This reading of ‘disposition’ is 
neutral about the connection between the way one is disposed to act and 
one’s final action (e.g., after careful reasoning). One can easily think of 
instances where one’s reasoning leads one to act at variance with one’s pre-
deliberative tendencies. Suppose that your dislike for eating meat leads you 
to conclude that you are disposed to avoid partaking of meat. But if you are 
at a dinner where there is only meat to be had, you might decide to act 
against your disposition to avoid running the risk of offending your host. In 
this weak sense of ‘disposition’, rational deliberation is to be understood as 
a process possibly detached from one’s pre-deliberative dispositions. 
 However, it is possible to imagine decision-contexts in which the 
agent is disposed to act in a certain way as a result of being disposed (by his 
genetic or psychological makeup) to reason in a way leading to that action. 
It is as if his reasoning process is “activated”, as it were, by his genes, say, 
whereupon he is causally led to decide to act in a corresponding manner. I 
try to demonstrate the reasonableness of supposing such cases to exist, 
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below. Such cases involve a strong sense of ‘disposition’, whereby the 
agent’s reasoning (and thus his eventual action) is determined by his genetic, 
psychological or any other makeup. It is this reading of the word that is 
more suitable for discussing Newcomb’s problem.17 
 Here is a case where it seems inarguable that the strong sense of 
‘disposition’ is in operation. In this case, the deliberative process itself 
bridges the gap, as it were, between the genetic or psychological or 
neurobiological state of the agent and the action eventually undertaken; the 
physical or psychological state of the agent is linked causally to (or sets in 
motion) his reasoning process which, in turn, leads causally to his final 
decision. Consider how a simple chess-playing computer “makes decisions” 
on its turn of play. The correlate in such a device, of various genetic, 
psychological or neurological human biases, is the programmed code by 
which it runs. The code contains a series of logical steps the computer must 
go through before making its move. If this were a mechanical computer, 
then a visual experience of the deliberative process could be obtained by 
witnessing the flow of electrons between capacitors and transistors causing 
certain logic gates to open and others to close which, in turn, cause other 
devices in the mechanical setup to come into play. These activities would 
be ‘seen’ to occupy a fixed causal sequence in accordance with the pre–
                                                
17 There also seem to be decision-contexts where the agent has no relevant dispositions, even in the 
weak sense. If I am faced with a choice between going to the hills for a holiday and spending time 
by the sea, but prefer neither over the other, then I am not disposed to act in any particular manner. 
If I also have no reason to prefer the one over the other, I might well decide using some random 
process like the toss of a coin. This sort of decision-context is not what occupies my attention in 
this chapter. My primary focus is Newcomb’s problem, where it is clear that the agent is at least 
weakly disposed to either take A alone or to take both boxes. I think that a weak interpretation of 
‘disposition’ does not suffice in explaining the predictor’s success, however. 
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programmed code, culminating in a move indicated by the machine, in 
much the same way that opening the back of a mechanical timepiece allows 
one to see the oscillations of half-wheels to cause cogs and gears to lock, 
leading to a movement of the clock hands. 
 It seems possible for a decision-making process to be fully 
deterministic in this way. And if a chess computer might arrive at a decision 
at the end of a pre-determinable causal chain (following its “disposition”), 
then it seems unreasonable to withhold the same of a more complex 
machine, even one more vastly complex, perhaps even a complex biological 
machine like a human agent. This suggests the following critical claim, 
which I will clarify and attempt to establish below: the agent’s eventual 
decision in Newcomb’s problem is “already contained” in his disposition to 
make that decision. 
To see my meaning, consider again the mechanical chess computer. 
For the writer of its code, or for someone who can decipher such code, or 
for a seasoned master who has played the machine several times, the 
deliberative mechanism of the device is laid bare in such a way that, before 
the machine has acted (i.e., reached the end of its deliberative process and 
communicated its move), it is possible, by following the causal links in the 
code, to know how it will act. To acknowledge this is to admit a sense in 
which the machine’s decision may be “read off” the code, and thus that it is 
“already contained” in the code. For you, unversed in code, the time lag 
between your move and the machine’s engenders the perception that the 
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computer is “still making up its mind”. You are prepared to assert, during 
this time, that the computer has “not yet decided” what to do. Your 
assertion is correct, if you mean simply that the computer “has not yet 
reached the end of the computational deliberative process” or, what is the 
same thing, “the computer has not yet communicated its decision”. But this 
is a relatively uninteresting sense of the computer’s having “not yet 
decided” what to do. Crucially, if the machine’s decision is contained in the 
code, in the sense explained above, then, in a derivative sense, the 
computer’s decision is already made, at the time that you made yours. For 
any player who has unravelled the code, it is even more obvious that the 
moment he moves, the machine’s move, regardless of the delay, is as good 
as made.18 
 In decision-making situations like these, while one may continue to 
isolate the instant at which the agent reaches the end of the causally-
governed deliberation, it would be untoward to regard this as the defining 
moment when the agent makes its decision. Any such notion of a “decisive 
moment” is a trifle unsettling, for, whatever the decision might be, there is a 
clear sense in which it has always been contained in the agent’s 
dispositions.19 It is easy to confuse the two senses of ‘disposition’, i.e., to 
                                                
18 One might find it incongruous that human players are easily beaten at chess by their mechanical 
counterparts if it only requires an understanding of its easily procurable code to know in advance 
how a computer will respond to one’s moves. The explanation is that even if one were to decipher 
the code, it would not be practically possible to know the computer’s move in advance. Its greater 
processing power in running through the causal links in the code is substantially faster. Modern 
chess machines are also programmed to occasionally make “random” moves. This makes its 
behaviour essentially unpredictable, though I don’t think that this affects my point in the text. 
19 Of course, when the reasoning process culminates, a human agent finds out what he is, in fact, 
going to do. In some sense now, the agent is privy to his own dispositions. The seed, as it were, of 
his decision is contained in his dispositions, and grows out causally, via the deliberation, into his 
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construe the word in a weak sense when, as in the description of 
Newcomb’s problem, the strong sense is the more appropriate. As a result 
of this misconstrual, one is liable to think of the deliberative process as 
being independent of our dispositions whereas it is in fact causally borne 
out of the same.20 If the issue at hand is knowing the agent’s decision from 
his disposition, then whether or not the causally-governed deliberative 
process has yet come to an end seems not to matter. Of course, the agent 
might be unaware of his disposition until his reasoning has come to an end; 
nevertheless, he must acknowledge that a genius with access to his 
disposition would in advance be able to “see” the decision causally unfold 
from it. In such a case, we may even say that the agent’s mind is made up 
before the deliberative sequence is initialised. 
 Employing the strong sense of ‘disposition’ in Newcomb’s problem 
enables us to explain why the predictor enjoys such a high degree of 
predictive success, which would otherwise be miraculous. When the 
predictor studies the agent’s disposition (for instance, his neurological state), 
he is not merely considering the agent’s pre-deliberative tendency to either 
take A alone or both boxes; instead, the neurological (or genetic, or 
psychological) state of the agent provides the predictor with an overview of 
the causal chain culminating in the decision. So he is like the expert 
                                                                                                                                 
action very much like, to borrow the analogy from horticulture, the mango seed causally results in 
a mango. 
20 Again, it must be remembered that I am not making a general claim about the appropriateness of 
using ‘disposition’ in the strong sense indiscriminately across all decision-contexts. My claim is 
restricted either to cases where we find the situation similar to that of the chess computer, or to 
cases involving a deterministic framework, where we have reason to believe that the way the agent 
will deliberate and subsequently act is knowable in advance. 
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programmer who, long before the computer has made its move, already 
knows what it will do by following the causal train from code to conduct. 
 If the links in the causal chain are (necessarily) rigid and the 
predictor (necessarily) correctly reads neurological states then we have 
(infallible) inerrant predictions.21 The predictor may fall into error if either 
the causal links are less than rigid or if he is prone to misread the 
disposition of the agent (say, his fancy cerebroscope malfunctions). At the 
other extreme, the predictor would not predict better than chance if the 
assumption of causal determinism breaks down or if he is equally likely to 
read one’s disposition as he is to misread it. Most people who discuss 
Newcomb’s problem agree that such a predictor as described is possible22, 
but it is also important to have some realistic account of his accuracy and 
not simply attribute it to crystal-ball gazing or other telepathic powers. 
 If the model of decision-making that I have been at pains to sketch is 
conceded to be feasible in Newcomb’s problem, then the case for taking A 
alone seems to me very strong. The model purports to show that, contrary to 
appearances, the decision to take either A alone or both boxes is (in some 
substantial sense) already made prior to the predictor’s prediction, let alone 
the agent’s action. The sense in question may be compared to that which 
                                                
21 Following the literature, we define an inerrant predictor as one who, in actual fact, never predicts 
incorrectly and an infallible predictor as one of which this description is necessary. 
22 If you are in the kind of situation described above, then you would expect your choices to be 
predictable. Given determinism and a predictor of great intelligence, it would be far more difficult 
to explain his failure than his success. The man who runs the coffee shop where I regularly head 
for supper almost always anticipates my order: 100 Plus and kosong bawang dua, as it happens. If 
this man, substantially less gifted than Newcomb’s predictor and with a far inferior psychological 
insight into me, does as well as he does, then any suggestion that the Newcomb predictor is 
impossible lacks an intuitive ring to it. 
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prevents a mango, say, from growing out of the seed of any other fruit. 
Thus I am understanding the agent’s decision in Newcomb’s problem to 
have its causal provenance in his disposition (e.g., neurological state). In the 
sense that matters, the disposition can then be treated as being the decision. 
So in basing his prediction on the agent’s disposition, the predictor is 
effectively basing it on the agent’s decision, and so it is the agent’s decision, 
after all, which causes the predictor to predict how he will act. This does not 
compel one to endorse backwards causation. In my description, the 
causation is still forward directed, with the decision (or the ‘seed’ of the 
decision, if one likes) commonly causing the predictor’s prediction as well 
as the agent’s subsequent action. To deny this is to reintroduce that special 
metaphysical moment, the moment when the agent makes its decision, that I 
have argued above is unacceptable in a model of the present sort. 
 Now, if it is my decision, after all, that causes the predictor to predict 
what I will do, then my decision causally affects the state of Box A 
(whether it contains a million dollars or nothing). The situation then is 
analogous to the forward causation version of the problem discussed at the 
beginning of this chapter. As such, the agent should take A alone in 
Newcomb’s original problem, no less than in the forward causation version. 
2.3. Two objections 
             My interpretation of Newcomb’s problem above derives largely 
from its ability to explain why the predictor is as accurate as he is. However, 
it might be open to challenge on a couple of counts. Firstly, it might be 
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argued that my model of how decisions are made gives short shrift to the 
autonomy that agents are presumed to have over their actions. In my model, 
it may be claimed, the agent does not actively decide; rather, he is some sort 
of an automaton like the chess playing computer, who waits for his decision 
to arrive at the end of a causal chain that initiates in his dispositions.23 If 
this is so, then he cannot reasonably be supposed to have a choice (or power 
to decide), whereupon Newcomb’s problem ceases any longer to qualify as 
a genuine decision-problem. 
 This objection involves two claims. First, that the agent has a 
genuine decision-problem if and only if he is free to choose between 
various courses of action. Second, that determinism and/or the advance 
predictability of his decision deprives him of that free choice. I accept the 
first claim but deny the second. 
Agreed, it is counterintuitive to imagine yourself deciding between 
going to the opera and having a kick-about with your soccer buddies if your 
wife holds a gun to your head and threatens to fire unless you take her to the 
opera.24 But the objector’s second claim is moot, since it does appear to me 
that, even if it was causally determined that I would have pizza for lunch 
today and even if this could, in principle, be antecedently predicted, still, in 
eating pizza, I chose freely (without coercion): I ate pizza because I wanted 
to. Foreknowledge of my eating pizza is consistent with foreknowledge that 
                                                
23The notion of  an agent having autonomy over his actions is presumably uncompromised if we 
use ‘disposition’ in the weak sense, since his capacity to reason is then independent of his 
disposition. 
24You may be deciding between going to the opera and coming to a gory end but you are hardly 
deciding between going to the opera and playing soccer. 
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I wanted to eat pizza. Now the possibility of someone’s knowing in advance 
what I will do (or what I will want to do) does not seem to me to threaten 
my freedom. For example, the mere fact that the man at the coffee shop (see 
note 22) knows, on most occasions, what my order will be does not mean 
that I was not free, on those occasions, to choose my own supper. 
As for the relationship between determinism and my freedom of 
choice, a similar defence seems to be (and has traditionally been regarded as 
being) available. Its being causally determined that I will eat pizza for lunch 
today is consistent with the fact that I will want to do as much. Surely, if I 
did what I wanted to do, it seems reasonable to suppose that I acted freely25.  
My overall response to this objection against interpreting Newcomb’s 
problem in the ‘forward causation manner’ is then simply to display the 
traditional banner of compatibilism.26 
 A second objection is that my reinterpretation of Newcomb’s 
problem robs it of theoretical interest. From the point of view of decision 
theory, Newcomb’s problem is interesting precisely because it represents a 
case where, even though the agent’s decision does not cause the relevant 
state of the world to materialise, the latter remains probabilistically 
dependent on his decision. As we saw in the first chapter, this combination 
                                                
25Perhaps what I wanted to do was itself determined; whether this undermines my freedom is 
however debatable. I do not see that it does. 
26I uphold the compatibilism of both foreknowledge and freedom, and that of determinism and 
freedom. I agree however that whether Newcomb’s problem is to be classified as a genuine 
decision problem will depend on the truth of these compatibilisms. Newcomb problems are in 
principle neutral about whether determinism holds true. Nevertheless, I assume that it does, at least 
in this chapter. This does not weaken my position, since many discussions of Newcomb’s problem 
are conducted in the context of determinism and it is easy to understand why. It permits a realistic 
account of the predictor’s accuracy. 
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of probabilistic dependence with causal independence is what is responsible 
for the conflict between different principles of rational decision-making 
such as EDT and CDT. 
          It seems to me that the crucial issue concerns our grounds for 
accepting the predictor’s accuracy. It is no explanation to say that the 
predictor is accurate because of (say) his impressive past track record. This 
is circular for we seek an explanation of the track record itself. Rather, an 
analysis of the mechanism by which the predictor makes his predictions 
seems warranted in order that the story concerning his accuracy remains 
credible. My suggestion in this chapter to locate the Newcomb predictor 
within a deterministic framework explains how he can make so few errors 
in judgement. If the explanation forces us to abandon the assumption, 
supposedly built into the problem, that the agent’s decision exerts no causal 
influence on the content of box A, then the problem is just incoherent to 
begin with. If this is conceded, then there is nothing much else to crow 
about. Either an explanation of the sort I have provided is accepted, in 
which case the assumption that the states be causally independent of the 
agent’s decision becomes untenable, or any belief the that predictor is likely 
to predict one’s choices accurately must be considered unjustified. 
Retaining the causal independence assumption requires sacrificing one’s 
grounds for believing the predictor to be accurate, and vice versa. Either 
way, we cannot hold that Newcomb’s problem is a decision-context that 
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showcases the aforementioned theoretically-interesting combination of 
probabilistic dependence and causal independence. 
If this conclusion is forced upon us, then it is unfortunate, since it 
deprives us of an instance where the recommendations of various traditional 
decision-principles conflict.27 On this score, Newcomb-like problems are 
not symptomatic of any divide between EDT and Nozick Dominance, or 
between EDT and CDT, as they have been supposed to be. The problem 
then loses its importance in decision theory. But it can hardly be said that 
this is my fault. I would like to point out, however, that the issue of which 
of the decision-theoretic principles mentioned above are correct remains 
outstanding. In particular, whether causal dependencies between actions and 
states are relevant to decision-making, or whether it suffices to consider 
probabilistic dependencies alone, remains unclear. In the final two chapters, 
I intend to focus on this issue independently of my present “forward 
causation” reinterpretation of Newcomb’s problem. Thus, the reader 
dissatisfied with this alleged shortcut strategy of resolving the paradox may 
leave it behind. I have a different set of reasons for defending a decision to 
take A alone (i.e., to one-box) in Newcomb’s problem. 
 In summary, I claimed in this chapter that investigating the 
predictor’s high accuracy rate suggests a certain model of how the agent 
“decides” in the Newcomb case. On this model, the neurological state (say) 
of the agent, on which the predictor bases his predictions, is a proxy for 
                                                
27 More so if, as I tend to believe, a coherent decision problem cannot be formulated with the 
interesting combination in question. 
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what I call the agent’s disposition to either take A alone or both boxes. The 
entire deliberative process of the agent, culminating in his eventual action, 
is a causal consequence of this disposition. In some strong sense then the 
decision is already contained in the agent’s disposition, and thus privy to 
the predictor. In that case, we can say that it is the agent’s decision which 
causes the predictor to predict as he does. If this description is reasonable, 




3. Alleged motivations for two-boxing 
 
The previous chapter outlined a way of interpreting the predictor’s 
accuracy such that the paradox no longer arises. That line of reasoning 
failed to do justice, however, to various decision-theoretic issues that are 
normally held to arise from the problem. In what follows, I therefore 
suspend my claim that Newcomb’s problem is a cleverly disguised case of 
ordinary forward causation, and agree, for the sake of argument, that it is a 
case where the content of box A is probabilistically dependent on, yet 
causally independent of, what the agent decides to do. As outlined in 
chapter 1, this raises important queries about whether it is probability or 
causation, as it were, which matters in decision-contexts, which I will 
address in these final two chapters. 
In this chapter, I discuss some arguments which advocate taking both 
boxes. In sections 3.1 (Lewis) and 3.3 (Nozick, Gibbard & Harper), I 
consider the claim that rational decisions must consider whether the agent’s 
actions causally influence the states of the world in question. Here, the 
relation between causation and counterfactual conditionals proves crucial. 
The sandwiched Section 3.2 (Fischer), on the other hand, considers an 
argument for two-boxing which tries to steer clear of causal considerations. 
However, I will argue that causal considerations are smuggled in via the 
back door. I do not agree that causal considerations such as those to be 
examined in this chapter should figure prominently in decision-making, but 
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I will be in a position to complete my argument for this claim only in the 
next chapter. 
3.1. Counterfactuals and Newcomb’s problem 
 The role of counterfactual conditionals in Newcomb’s problem has 
generally been considered significant. For expository convenience, consider 
a limiting version of the problem where the agent is completely certain that 
the predictor will correctly predict his choice. Under this assumption of an 
inerrant predictor, an argument for taking A alone can be expressed as 
follows: 
Argument 1 
1. If take A alone, the predictor would have predicted this, and would 
have put $1M in A 
2. If I take both boxes, the predictor would have predicted this, and 
would have put $0 in A 
3. If I take A alone, I will get $1M     (1) 
4. If I take both boxes, I will get $1K     (2) 
5. I will get more money if I take A alone than if I take both boxes 
(3, 4) 
C. I should take A alone      (5) 
At this point, let us concede, following Horgan and Olin, among others, that 
only a counterfactual interpretation of the conditionals in this argument can 
support the deduction of C.28 
                                                
28See Horgan (1981), 332, where a similar argument is discussed; also Olin (2003), 120. In the 
final chapter, I will withdraw this concession and show how it is possible for the argument to 
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 Interestingly, the two-boxer has a similar counterfactual-based 
argument for taking both boxes: 
Argument 2 
1*. If A contains $1M, then I will get $1M if I take A alone and $1M + 
$1K if I take both boxes 
2*. If A contains $0, then I will get $0 if I take A alone and $1K if I take 
both boxes 
3*. Either A contains $M or A contains $0 
4*. Either I will get $1M if I take A alone and $1M + $1K if I take both 
boxes, or I will get $0 if I take A alone and $1K if I take both boxes.                               
         (1*, 2*, 3*) 
5*. I will get more money if I take both boxes than if I take A alone. 
(4*) 
C*. I should take both boxes.     (5*) 
Indeed, the two-boxer will contend that Argument 1 above is unsound as 
premises (1) and (2) cannot both be true. 
It is not hard to see why. Since the predictor has already made his 
prediction (and the content of box A has already been fixed), then whatever 
I do now, the predictor would still have predicted whatever he has predicted. 
Suppose he predicted that I would take both boxes. Then if I take both 
boxes, that would have been his prediction, but if I take A alone, that would 
still have been his prediction. (His prediction has already been made.) 
                                                                                                                                 
succeed given mere material readings of the conditionals. If the agent is not certain that the 
predictor’s prediction will prove correct, then the argument must take a slightly more complex 
form, but this will not affect the discussion of this section. 
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Likewise, if he predicted that I would take A alone, then that would have 
been his prediction, whether I take A alone or take both boxes. So premises 
1 and 2 of Argument 1 above cannot both be true. (At least one of them is 
false.) Or so the two-boxer would claim. From the one-boxer’s point of 
view, however, since the predictor is certain to be accurate, nothing could 
be more true than that both 1 and 2., i.e., premises 1 and 2 simply express a 
certainty in the accuracy of the predictor. Indeed, from the one-boxer’s 
point of view, each of 1* and 2* (of Argument 2) is a false statement, in 
failing to respect the accuracy of the predictor. 
Or consider statements 5 and 5*, further down the argument: 
5. I will get more money if I take A alone than if I take both boxes 
5*. I will get more money if I take both boxes than if I take A alone 
For the one-boxer, statement 5* (of Argument 2) is false in failing to 
respect the accuracy of the predictor. For the two-boxer, however, it is 
statement 5 (of Argument 1) which is false in failing to recognize that the 
agent’s decision will not (causally) affect the content of box A. This 
disagreement is obviously related to the previous one. 
Since the statements in dispute here are all counterfactual statements, 
the issue concerns how truth values are to be ascribed to counterfactuals. 
For example, most people agree that 5 and 5* above cannot both be true, so 
the question is how we are to decide which one is true. Likewise for 1 and 2, 
as compared to 1* and 2*. 
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In the following discussion, I will work with Lewis’s popular 
“possible worlds” framework of counterfactuals. This does not imply that I 
endorse the framework; the intention is just to contextualise, within Lewis’s 
framework, my critique of the two-boxer’s claim that statements 1 and 2 of 
Argument 1 above cannot both be true. I will argue that there is a certain 
kind of “deadlock” in the one-boxer’s and two-boxer’s criticisms of each 
other, as sketched above, which fails to advance the cause of either.29 
 In a possible-worlds framework, a counterfactual ‘A □→ S’ is true if 
and only S is true in the “closest” possible world (i.e., “closest” to the actual 
world) where A is true. The issue of the truth of ‘A □→ S’ thus turns on the 
issue of determining the truth-value of S in the closest possible world where 
A is true, i.e., in the closest possible true-antecedent world.30 
 Now, “similarity” or “closeness” relations between possible worlds 
are widely accepted to be steeped in vagueness. As it turns out, there are 
two importantly different (so-called) resolutions of such vagueness, known 
as the standard and backtracking resolutions. How one “resolves” the 
vagueness of a counterfactual is crucial in answering the question whether 
that counterfactual is true or false. As will be seen, which resolution is 
appropriate turns on the question of which beliefs about the actual world 
should properly be “carried over” to the closest possible true-antecedent 
world. It turns out that Argument 1 above is unsound if the standard 
                                                
29 For some discussion about opposition to a possible worlds treatment of counterfactuals, see 
Woods (1997), Chapter 5. 
30 This is a simplified claim. In Lewis’s later work, for example, ‘A □→ S’ is true if and only S is 
true in some A-world that is closer than any in which S is false: see, e.g., Woods’s discussion of 
Lewis; Woods (1997), 45-6. The simplification will not affect my discussion. 
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resolution of vagueness is appropriate for counterfactuals occurring in the 
context of Newcomb’s problem. On the other hand, if a backtracking 
resolution of vagueness is more appropriate, then it is Argument 2 which 
becomes unsound. I will argue for a “deadlock” over which resolution is 
appropriate, and so for a deadlock over whether Argument 1 or 2 above is 
correct. 
The difference between the standard and the backtracking resolutions 
of a counterfactual may be illustrated with some simple examples. Suppose 
that you and John are tourists, exploring the top of the Eiffel tower. 
Consider the counterfactual, ‘If John had jumped off the Eiffel tower five 
minutes ago, then he would now be dead’. One might think this 
counterfactual to be true. (The closest possible world where he lunges from 
the tower five minutes ago is one where he is now dead.) But suppose you 
also know John to be an extremely prudent sort of chap who would never 
engage in any form of rash or reckless behaviour. Perhaps he is your best 
friend who has a beer with you every evening, and you know him to be 
content with life and in no way depressed or suicidal. Then you are well 
placed to believe that John would jump from the tower only if he knew that 
there was a net at the bottom to break his fall, e.g., he has signed up for 
Fear Factor. In that case, you may want to contest that the closest possible 
world where he jumped off the tower five minutes ago is one where he 
cannons to the ground and ends up in a bloody mess. Rather, you might 
consider the closest possible world in question to be one where he lands 
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safely into the safety net. So you might deem the counterfactual ‘If John 
had jumped off the Eiffel tower five minutes ago, he would now be dead’ to 
be false. 
 If the example seems contrived, then consider this one: you know 
that Sovan will get married only if he knows that he will thereby be happy. 
You also know that Sovan is currently single, as he has yet to meet anyone 
bearing the promise of a blissful conjugal relationship. What should one say 
about the closest possible world where Sovan is now married? Is it a world 
in which, consistent with Sovan’s actual attitude towards marriage, he has 
already found that special someone, and is thus now happily married? Or is 
it rather a world in which, consistent with his actual state of not yet having 
found that special someone, he has nevertheless gotten married, and is thus 
now in a state of utter distress? If you are confused about the right answer, 
then my point is demonstrated. Intuition seems divided about identifying 
the closest  possible world in which the antecedent of the counterfactual is 
true, as in the previous example. In fact, the problem is that of trying to 
decide whether the vagueness of the counterfactuals should be resolved in 
the standard or backtracking way, as I shall now try to show. In the process, 
I hope also to clarify the difference between the two resolutions. 
Suppose there is a casual tourist, Bob, at the top of the Eiffel tower 
as well, but who knows nothing about John. If the question was put to him, 
then Bob might find it reasonable to think that if John had jumped off the 
tower five minutes ago, then he would now be dead. For Bob, the closest 
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possible world in which John lunges off the tower (call it W) is one where, 
in accordance with actual fact, there was no safety net around the tower five 
minutes ago. Bob has no reason to think that W should be different from the 
actual world at any moment before the time of John’s hypothesised jump. 
So it is plausible for him to require that W have a history identical to that of 
the actual world, at least up till the moment of the jump. For example, if 
Bob had an apple for dinner yesterday, then this is true in W as well, or if 
John was wearing a red shirt ten minutes ago, then this is true in W as well, 
and so on and so forth.31 
It seems natural in this way to place the following criterion on W: 
that W should share the same past as the actual world up to the time of the 
antecedent. This criterion is important to the standard resolution of the 
vagueness of counterfactuals. Under the standard resolution, the 
counterfactual ‘If John had jumped off the Eiffel tower five minutes ago, he 
would now be dead’ will emerge as true, because of this criterion. 
 But if you believe that in jumping off the tower without a safety net 
John would be acting out of character, then this belief, combined with facts 
about the stability of people’s characters, makes it reasonable to think that 
John should be no more rash or reckless in W than in the actual world. The 
stronger your belief in the stability of John’s character traits, the less likely 
you are to entertain the prospect of him jumping off the tower without 
                                                
31 Of course, from the moment of the jump, both worlds stand a chance of diverging from each 
other in so far as what happens in each of the worlds is concerned. But, for the purposes of 
identifying the closest possible world, what happens subsequently to the point in time of the jump 
is inconsequential. 
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precautions. Accordingly, you will tend to require the presence of safety 
nets around the tower in W at the time of John’s jump, minimally. But if 
there were nets around the  tower in W at around the time of John’s jump, 
then for some duration of time (minimally, from the moment the nets were 
put up until the moment when John jumped), the history of W diverges in 
many ways from the history of the actual world: there is a net in W, the net 
casts a shadow, there are birds sitting on the net, etc., none of which is true 
in the actual world. However, it is reasonable to suppose that this 
divergence need not weaken the claim of W to being the “closest” possible 
world to the actual. 
This second method of identifying W, where one “tracks back” into 
the past and changes its history from the actual world, so as to be consistent 
in another way with some firmly-held belief about the actual world (that 
John will not act out of character; that Sovan will marry only if he is certain 
of conjugal bliss) is the backtracking resolution of vagueness. Under this 
resolution, the counterfactual ‘If John had jumped off the Eiffel tower five 
minutes ago, then he would now be dead’ is false, because in the closest 
possible world where John jumped off, he was saved by the net around the 
tower.32 
                                                
32 It seems to me that counterfactuals are asserted for at least two different purposes; some intend 
to express a causal connection, others make a point about a certain belief about the actual world. 
Thus, there appears to be a certain purpose-dependence in determining whether the standard or the 
backtracking resolution is appropriate. When I judge ‘If John had jumped off the Eiffel tower five 
minutes ago, then he would now be dead’ to be true (under the standard resolution), I am 
expressing that jumping from the tower would cause his death. When I judge the counterfactual to 
be false (under the backtracking resolution), I am focusing on what I strongly believe to be true of 
his character, that he is not the sort of person to jump off the tower for no good reason. Thus, in the 
first case, the standard resolution looks natural to adopt; in the second, the intuition for using the 
backtracking resolution is compelling. 
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 In addition to clarifying the difference between a standard and a 
backtracking resolution of a counterfactual, the examples above purport to 
demonstrate the existence of cases where “commonsense” prefers the 
backtracking resolution to the standard resolution, or at least to find either 
resolution plausible. On this point, however, Lewis disagrees, claiming that 
we ordinarily and typically resolve counterfactuals in the standard way: 
We ordinarily resolve the vagueness of counterfactuals in such a way that 
counterfactual dependence is asymmetric (except perhaps in cases of 
time travel or the like). Under this standard resolution, backtracking 
arguments are mistaken: if the present were different the past would be 
the same, but the same past causes would fail somehow to cause the 
same present effects. (Lewis 1979, 457.) 
 
Lewis then proceeds to provide a theoretical framework for identifying the 
closest possible, true-antecedent world, consistent with his belief that we 
ordinarily resolve counterfactuals in the standard way.33 
According to Lewis, four considerations, ranked in a certain order of 
importance, help determine whether a given possible world is “closer” to 
the actual world than another. If several possible worlds are competing for 
“closeness” to the actual world, according to Lewis: 
(1) It is of the first importance to avoid big, widespread, diverse 
violations of law. 
(2) It is of the second importance to maximize the spatio-temporal region 
throughout which perfect match of particular fact prevails. 
                                                
33 As in the quote, Lewis does admit special contexts where the backtracking resolution is 
appropriate, e.g., cases involving time travel or backwards causation. These contexts are not 
relevant to Newcomb’s problem, however, for which Lewis favours the standard resolution and is 
a firm two-boxer. However, in my opinion, the assumption that we ordinarily favour the standard 
resolution of the counterfactual is, as shown by my examples above, contentious in the first place. 
Nevertheless, I proceed to discuss Lewis’s theoretical framework on his own terms. 
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(3) It is of the third importance to avoid even small, localized, simple 
violations of law. 
(4) It is of little or no importance to secure approximate similarity of 
particular fact, even in matters that concern us greatly.34 
Since Lewis claims that approximate similarity is of negligible import and I 
have no bones to grind against this, I turn my attention to (1), (2) and (3) of 
the Lewis ranking. 
 Let us first examine the notion of a violation of law. Now, all 
possible worlds being considered for closeness to the actual world differ 
from the latter in, at least, one essential respect. In the actual world, the 
antecedent is false while in the possible worlds being considered, the 
antecedent is true.35 To account for the antecedent’s truth in a world which 
is “close” to the actual world, Lewis employs the notion of a “local miracle”, 
as in his condition (3). Thus, to explain why John jumped off the tower in 
some close possible world, Lewis imagines a “local miracle” therein; for 
example, a few extra neurons fired in John’s brain at the moment in 
question, causing an uncontrollable suicidal urge.36 Now, since some such 
miracle must exist in any of the possible worlds under consideration, Lewis 
thinks that its mere existence cannot help determine which of the possible 
                                                
34 See Lewis (1979), 272. 
35 Lewis’s present point concerns cases where the antecedent is false, because, if the antecedent is 
true, then the closest possible antecedent-true world is (presumably) just the actual world itself. 
36 Other ways of accounting for the antecedent’s falsehood are implausible. If it is suggested that 
different laws operate in the world in question, then the task of judging whether the consequent 
holds in that world is much harder. Or if we suppose the world to have had different “initial 
conditions”, and then to have evolved according to normal laws, then the world is not plausibly 
held to be “close” to the actual world. 
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worlds in question is closest to the actual world. (I will return to this point 
shortly, in connection with condition (2).) 
Where large widespread miracles are concerned, as in condition (1), 
Lewis seems to judge correctly that a possible world containing them fails 
to meet our intuition regarding what can be expected in a “close” possible 
world. In the case of John, a possible world containing a large, widespread 
miracle might be one where John jumps off the tower, but then all traces of 
his action are miraculously erased. After he has jumped, gravity 
momentarily reverses direction and he is put back on the tower balcony; 
people witnessing the incident suffer from a partial loss of memory, etc.; it 
is as if he never jumped off the building even though he did. No one would 
consider this to be a close possible world to the actual world, let alone the 
closest possible world. Counterfactuals would otherwise be of no practical 
use in revealing anything of consequence about the actual world. 
 Let me, however, explain what I consider to be the most contentious 
stipulation of the Lewisian framework, relating to conditions (2) and (3). 
Lewis thinks that, once true-antecedent worlds with large violations of the 
law have been eliminated, it remains to maximise the coincidence of these 
worlds with the actual past, as in condition (2). This requirement is what 
blocks the backtracking resolution of vagueness. In the case of John, for 
example, a “local miracle” which makes him jump off the tower at the very 
last second, against the entire force of his character, will fit the bill better 
than a “local miracle” which involves a net mysteriously appearing around 
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the tower at an earlier moment.37 The latter world, as noted previously, will 
diverge from the actual world for a longer period of history than the former 
world. However, it is not easy for me to discern where Lewis derives the 
support for this requirement from.38 
The point is that some local miracles are more “plausible” than 
others. Though it might seem like an oxymoron to speak about the 
comparative “plausibility” of miracles, there is a sense in which one is less 
incredulous about certain miracles than others. This derives from, I think, 
the strength of one’s belief in the law, whose violation constitutes the 
miracle. Given a conviction that John will not act out of character, one 
would think a miracle involving various neurons firing in John’s brain very 
unlikely. One might find it more plausible, rather, to swallow a “smaller” 
miracle, of a different sort, at the cost of having occurred further back in 
antecedent time. Thus, not all local miracles are “believable” to the same 
degree. The fact is that our beliefs about the actual world may be ranked in 
terms of what we consider relatively sacrosanct and therefore, inviolable. 
When one judges a possible world for closeness with the actual, it is quite 
understandable to require the closest possible world to reflect this ranking, 
even if it implies that the said world suffers from a longer divergence 
between its past and the actual past. In particular, in cases where intuition 
favours a backtracking resolution because of a strong, explicitly-entertained 
                                                
37 John need not be acting out of character if he jumps off the tower onto a safety net. It is 
consistent with his character so far that he fancies free-fall activities, for instance. 
38 Lewis’s ranking is designed to favour the standard resolution. (See Lewis 1979, passim.) So his 
criterion (2) goes unchallenged. Whenever the backtracking resolution has force, however, 
maximising the coincidence with the actual past becomes questionable, as I try to explain now. 
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belief about the actual world, it does not seem obvious that the trade-off 
between the “plausibility” of the required miracle and the historical 
coincidence with the actual world coincide be automatically settled in 
favour of the latter, as Lewis presupposes in his criterion (2). 
To see my meaning more concretely, let us contextualise the 
preceding discussion within Newcomb’s problem. The question is why 
someone like Lewis (a two-boxer) would be unwilling to hold that both of 
these counterfactuals (from Argument 1 above) are true: 
1. If take A alone, the predictor would have predicted this, and would 
have put $1M in A. 
2. If I take both boxes, the predictor would have predicted this, and 
would have put $0 in A. 
Expanding on the discussion above, I think I can show that this 
unwillingness has no clear foundation. 
Suppose that you are in fact a one-boxer. Then you are in a world, 
WA, where your brain state at time t causes the predictor to predict at t that 
you will decide to one-box. In accordance with neurophysiological laws, 
your brain state also causes you to decide to one-box at a later time t’. The 
closest possible world to WA in which the antecedent of 1 is true is 
(presumably) just WA, and so 1 is true. Now, let W be a world which 
matches WA perfectly up till a split-second before t’, when some deviant 
chemical reaction “miraculously” happens and you end up taking both 
boxes. Under the standard resolution, the closest possible world to WA in 
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which the antecedent of 2 is true is W, and so 2 is false, since, in W, the 
predictor did not predict that you would take both boxes. Likewise, if you 
are in fact a two-boxer, then, 1 is false and 2 is true, given the standard 
resolution. This explains why Lewis rejects that both 1 and 2 are true. 
  But let us look at things from the one-boxer’s point of view. The 
agent believes that there are causal links between his brain state at t and the 
predictor’s prediction, as well as between his brain state at t and his 
subsequent action at t’. The more firmly he believes these causal links to be 
in place, the greater he will consider to be the “local miracle” (e.g., the 
chemical reaction above) needed at a possible world in which either link is 
violated. Consider instead a possible world W’ which matches WA perfectly 
up till a split-second before t, at which point you “miraculously” come to 
have a different brain state from that which you have in WA. In W’, the 
predictor predicts that you will take both boxes, which is precisely what you 
end up doing at t’. Unlike the miracle in W, the miracle in W’ does not 
concern a violation of the causal link between your brain state and the 
predictor’s prediction, nor that between your brain state and your eventual 
decision but, rather, relates to a breakdown of causal laws prior to t. 
Both W and W’ are worlds where the antecedent of 2 is true, but 
which one is closer to WA? By Lewis’s ranking, W is closer, but it seems 
open to someone to assert, on the contrary, that W’ is in fact closer, on the 
grounds that a “miracle” which violates either the brain-state-prediction 
causal link or the brain-state-action causal link, is a significantly more 
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implausible “miracle” than one which changes the agent’s brain state 
suddenly a split-second before t. 
 If the two “miracles” in question were equally acceptable, then I 
could concede that the closest possible world should then just be the world 
possessing the larger stretch of coincident history with WA, in which case W 
would be closer than W’. However, in the case just considered, it is arguable, 
as above, that the “miracle” in W is more implausible that that in W’.  As 
such, the fact that W has the larger stretch of coincident history with WA is 
not decisive. This comes out even more clearly if we stipulate that the 
predictor makes his prediction some small time (say, a few seconds) before 
the agent makes his choice. Under this description, someone who supports 
the backtracking resolution in choosing W’ as the closest possible world to 
WA is buying a “more acceptable” miracle at the negligible price of having 
the history between W’ and WA diverge for just a few extra seconds. So it 
remains unclear that Lewis is right to hold that 1 and 2 cannot both be true. 
 I consider it worth the while to investigate now whether Lewis’s 
standard resolution could be supported by some strong belief about the 
actual world which the agent holds, in the same way as the backtracking 
resolution relies on the almost certain belief that the predictor will predict 
correctly. Could it be supposed that, in adopting the standard resolution in 
the context of Newcomb’s problem, the agent is appealing to a belief that 
money, once placed in Box A by the predictor, cannot subsequently vanish 
no matter what the agent now does? I think so, as noted in passing at the 
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start of this section. Then it turns out that the contest between the standard 
and the backtracking resolution in Newcomb’s problem boils down to 
whether a belief in the powers of the predictor or a belief that money does 
not simply vanish from boxes should carry more weight in determining 
which the closest possible world is. This being the case, as far as I can see, 
the judgement of intuition does not incline either way; there is a deadlock.39 
Let me reiterate what I hope to have established. It is agreed that 
whether Argument 1 or Argument 2 is unsound turns on whether certain 
counterfactuals occurring therein should be resolved in the standard or the 
backtracking way. In Newcomb’s problem (and cases like it), intuition fails 
miserably in choosing between the two, and I have also argued that 
appealing to a theoretical framework such as Lewis’s does not help much. 
The dilemma is well expressed in this passage of Ayer’s, in which we are 
bounced back and forth between standard and backtracking resolutions of 
various counterfactuals:  
‘If Hitler had not invaded Russia, he would have won the war.’ … 
Confronted with the last example, one might argue: Even if Hitler had 
not invaded Russia, he would still have lost the war: Why? Because 
sooner or later the Americans would have come in and in the long run the 
Germans would not have been able to resist them. But would the 
Americans have come in if the Japanese had not attacked them, and 
would the Japanese have gone to war if the Russians had not been 
engaged with the Germans? Or again, it might be claimed that if 
Germany had not been at war with Russia, then even if the Americans 
had come in all the same, we should still not have won the war, since the 
                                                
39 Intuitions in favour of the standard and the backtracking resolutions generally exist 
independently of each other. It is not always that if the standard resolution sounds plausible, then 
the backtracking resolution appears untenable. Instances are readily generated (e.g., the examples 
provided in the beginning, or Newcomb’s problem itself) where a strong intuition for the standard 
resolution co-exists with an equally strong intuition for the backtracking resolution. For a different 
(“meta” level) argument that there is a deadlock between the standard and the backtracking 
resolutions in Newcomb’s problem, see Horgan (1985). 
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German divisions which were tied up in Russia would then have been 
free to oppose our landing in the West. But then the atom bomb would 
have done for them. But if the Germans had not been so fully committed 
to a conventional war in Russia, might they not have developed it too? 
These may not all be equally good arguments but they are all respectable 
and typical of the way in which such debates are conducted. Yet it is not 
at all easy to see how one is to decide between them. (Ayer 1972, 123-4) 
 
The counterfactual interpretation of Newcomb’s problem does not therefore 
advance the argument for taking A alone or for taking both boxes.  
Why do counterfactuals seem germane to decision making? One 
view is that it is because, in choosing between various actions available to 
him, an agent wants to know how his actions might causally affect things, 
as we saw from the discussion of Gibbard and Harper (CDT) in the 
previous chapter. It is this consideration, as well, which leads Lewis to 
favour standard resolutions of counterfactuals over backtracking resolutions 
in Newcomb’s problem. But it seems open to someone to dispute that such 
causal considerations are indispensable, on the grounds, as argued above, 
that backtracking resolutions of counterfactuals are no less acceptable in 
decision-contexts than standard resolution counterfactuals, even though the 
former, unlike the latter, do not reflect the causal efficacy of the agent’s 
actions. It is therefore wise for a two-boxer not to rest his case for two-
boxing on such causal considerations. In the next section, I outline an 
attempt to resolve Newcomb’s paradox which, on account of the problems 




3.2. Fischer and inaccessibility 
 Fischer (1994) has argued that taking both boxes is the correct 
decision in Newcomb’s problem, while trying to circumvent the 
counterfactual quagmire discussed above. In fact, he aims to refute the one-
boxer without referring to whether the agent’s decision has any causal 
effect on the state of box A. He thinks that causal considerations should not 
come into it at all: 
I believe [my approach] is more natural than the approach which restricts 
the reasons that are relevant to deliberation to those one brings about or 
causes. This widely-accepted approach, “causal decision theory”, would 
issue in the same benefits as [my approach], but it seems to me 
somewhat ad hoc … it does not explain why I should not be interested in 
reasons that obtain in the scenarios apparently relevant to my 
deliberations even if I do not (or would not) cause them to obtain … 
Suppose, somewhat fancifully, I know I can perform some simple action, 
and I know that if I were to do it, something wonderful would obtain (but 
not as a result of my action – the wonderful thing is caused by someone 
else or mysteriously would appear). Why should I not do the thing in 
question? Why should I desist if someone points out that, after all, I 
would not be causing the wonderful thing to obtain? In contrast, [my 
approach] explains the restriction on reasons in a natural, appealing way 
– by reference to the intuitive picture of the future as necessarily being an 
extension of the past. (Fischer 1994, 102-3) 
 
To see what this means, recall that it was implicit in the preceding 
discussion that the one-boxer, assuming him to be facing an inerrant 
predictor, believes that he effectively has a choice between going home 
either a million dollars or a thousand dollars richer, corresponding to his 
choice between taking A alone and taking both boxes, respectively. (This 
was implicit in his acceptance of statements 1 and 2 of Argument 1 above.) 
Fischer argues, however, that no one in Newcomb’s problem can sensibly 
believe, at the point of deciding what to do, that he has any such choice 
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between a million and a thousand dollars. Consider the following “forking 
path” scheme, a framework that is supposed to make the fallacy of holding 
the said belief clear: 
 
t            Predictor makes his prediction 
        P 
 
 
     Predictor puts $M in A            Predictor puts $0 in A 
 
 
t’     Q                     R 
 
 





            $1M  $1M + $1K                        $0         $1K 
 
Here, P represents the predictor making his prediction at some point t, prior 
to the moment of your decision. Accordingly, he has put $M in A or left it 
empty. At t’, the moment of your decision, the content of A is thus “fixed” 
in the past, i.e., has already been determined. Since you are ignorant about 
the content of A, you do not know whether you are at Q or R; you do not 
know which direction, as it were, the actual world has headed from P. You 
know only that you are either at Q or at R. Either way, in appraising the 
outcomes available for your taking, you must consider, according to Fischer, 
only those outcomes which are extensions from your particular position 
(“extensions of the past”, in his words above). Thus, supposing yourself to 
be at Q, you must consider your choice restricted to Q-outcomes only, i.e., 
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$1M and ($1M + $1K) only. Similarly, supposing yourself to be at R, you 
can only suppose yourself to be choosing between R-outcomes, i.e., $0 and 
$1K. From node Q, in other words, R-outcomes are “unactualizable” or 
“inaccessible”, and vice versa: 
… it is reasonable to restrict one’s attention to those possible worlds one 
can actualize: the only reasons that are relevant to practical reasoning are 
reasons that obtain in the worlds one can actualize (or which are 
accessible to one). This idea, combined with the claim that one can only 
actualize those possible worlds which are extensions of our world (in the 
sense that they share the past of the actual world) allows us to resolve 
[these issues]. (Fischer 1994, 96, my italics) 
 
Evidently, then, you should take both boxes for, notwithstanding 
whether you are at Q or R, you know that your choices are such as to leave 
you better off by taking both boxes.40 Thus, the one-boxer, in believing that 
he is choosing between $1M and $1K, believes erroneously that he has, at 
time t’, “access” both to the $1M outcome and the $1K outcome. According 
to Fischer, this belief violates the principle that one “can get to” (i.e., 
“access”) only those possible worlds which are extensions of the actual 
past: 
… think of the future as a garden of forking paths, or a branching tree-
like structure in which various possible futures fork off of a single past. 
All the possible future paths are extensions of the actual past, and thus 
the only paths I can take share the actual past. Hence, in my deliberations 
the reasons that are relevant are the ones that obtain along these paths: I 
should restrict my attention to these reasons in my deliberations, and the 
fact that there is some reason that obtains along a path which is not an 
extension of the actual past cannot be relevant to my practical reasoning. 
(op. cit., 102) 
 
                                                
40 This partitioning of states of the world, according to whether they are extensions of a common 
past, is not strictly equivalent to partitioning states of the world with respect to whether they are 
causally independent of the actions being considered, even if we stipulate that causes are 
temporally prior to their effects. I will revisit this point at the end of this section. 
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 To appreciate the intuition behind Fischer’s forking path scheme, 
consider yourself driving in a puzzle-happy town (new to you) with 
perplexing road signs. You reach a junction whose road sign, helpfully, 
informs you that if you took a left at the previous junction, then you are now 
at a junction from which a left turn will take you to the beach, whereas a 
right turn will bring you to the 15th century cathedral. On the other hand, if 
you took a right at the previous junction, then you are now at a junction 
from which a left turn will fetch you to the mosque, a right turn to the local 
watering hole. For the life of you, you cannot recall if you took a left or a 
right at the previous junction, but surely, Fischer would argue, when you 
consider what choices are now before you, you must agree that your 
situation is such that either you have a choice between the beach and the 
cathedral, or else you have a choice between the mosque and the pub, even 
if you do not know which choice is in fact before you. It would be illogical 
for you to think that you could be faced, at the junction that you are now at, 
with a choice between the beach and the pub, say, or any other combination 
of destinations not physically rooted in the same junction. 
 Whether or not Fischer is right about this, one thing, at the very least, 
is clear. If you do recall which turn you took at the previous junction, then 
you would be irrational to believe that you now have a choice between any 
two particular destinations which you know to be rooted in different 
junctions. Suppose you recall taking a left at the last junction. This commits 
you to believing that your present choice is between sunning yourself at the 
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seaside and marvelling at the architectural grandeur of the cathedral. You 
cannot sensibly entertain the thought that by going left now, you will find 
yourself at the mosque, or that by going right, you will get to the pub. So 
you cannot sensibly take yourself to have a choice between, say, going to 
the beach and going to the pub. 
 Comparably, in Newcomb’s problem, if you (somehow) come to 
know what box A contains before being making your decision, then you 
cannot sensibly regard yourself as having a choice between outcomes which 
are “not rooted in the same node”. For example, if you know that A 
contains $1M, then you must believe that your choice between taking A 
alone and taking both boxes is the same as a choice between $1M and ($1M 
+ $1K). Similarly, if you know that A is moneyless, this forces you to 
believe that you will either pocket nothing or else take home $1K. Crucially, 
under these revised circumstances (i.e., where you know the content of box 
A beforehand), the one-boxer can no longer uphold that, by choosing 
between taking A alone and taking both, he is choosing between getting a 
million dollars and getting a thousand. In short, when some past fact is 
known to the agent, it is acceptable to hold the Fischer-like position that the 
agent must regard as “available to him” (or accessible by him) only those 
outcomes which are extensions of the known past in question. So a 
modification of Newcomb’s problem in which the agent knows beforehand 
what A contains tilts rationality, both intuitively and with theoretical 
justification, in favour of taking both boxes. 
 60
 However, when Fischer’s suggestion is applied to Newcomb’s 
original problem, or to any decision-context where some relevant fact about 
the past is unknown to the agent, it runs into rough weather. For instance, 
driving about in the puzzle-happy town, the forgetful driver may very 
naturally believe something like this: if I take a left turn, I will either end up 
at the beach or at the mosque, even though she knows that only one of these 
destinations is at the end of the road in question. It is precisely her not 
knowing where she is which prevents her from being forced into the 
Fischer-like position that one of the destinations above is “inaccessible” to 
her. In other words, relative to what she is ignorant of, there is a sense in 
which both the beach and the mosque are equally “accessible” to her; there 
seems to be no logical or intuitive objection to her holding this view. 
This is a sense of ‘accessibility’ under which the agent may believe 
that both of the destinations above are accessible, even though she knows 
that they do not “spring from the same node”. Fischer clearly cannot have 
this weak sense of ‘accessibility’ in mind, for, if he did, then he would be 
wrong to claim, as he does, that outcomes which are extensions of different 
pasts cannot both be accessible, as the example above shows. The point is 
that this weak sense of ‘accessibility’ cannot support the rationality of 
taking both boxes in Newcomb’s problem in the way that Fischer desires. 
On the other hand, jettisoning this weak sense of ‘accessibility’ also 
seems like a high price to pay, as it would make Fischer unable to handle 
various ordinary decision-contexts where there is no dominant action. For 
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example, suppose I am faced with a choice, now at 5 pm, between taking 
my child (who has been groaning from a toothache) to the dentist, and 
staying at home to watch a potentially thrilling game of soccer. The dentist, 
the only one in town and a friend of mine, told me over drinks last evening 
that he might be taking his wife to a 4 pm movie today; if not, he would be 
at his clinic till closing at 6 pm. I do not know whether he took his wife to 
the movie at 4 pm and hence, whether he is at his clinic now. Though I 
know that the actual past is “fixed” with respect to whether he took his wife 
to the movies, I do not know what that past is. If he is now at his clinic, I 
would prefer taking my child to him over watching the game. If not, 
considering the futility of a miserable drive to the clinic with a groaning 
child, I would, rather watch the broadcast with a glass of scotch in hand. 
 In this sort of situation, there is no dominant action, as the following 
matrix makes clear (the numbers are my utilities for having acted in such 
and such a way and being in such and such s state): 
 
Such situations where no dominant action exists, and where the actual past 
is unknown, though relevant to the decision, abound. Normally, one would 
appeal to a traditional expected utility calculation (as per EDT) in order to 
discern what is rational to do. Unfortunately, if Fischer jettisons the weak 
 Dentist at movies Dentist in clinic 
Go to dentist 1 3 
Watch soccer 2 1 
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sense of ‘accessibility’ mentioned above, then he can no longer appeal to 
such a calculation in a situation like this. 
The reason is that there seems to be a sense in which the traditional 
expected utility calculation involves comparing outcomes stemming from 
different pasts, and thus considering such outcomes to be equally 
“accessible” by the agent.41 For example, in deciding whether to take my 
child to the dentist, my knowledge that the “happy-cured-child” outcome 
(top right) and the “futile-drive” outcome (top left) are extensions of 
different pasts, does not stop me from comparing the utilities of both 
outcomes using a weighted utility calculation. This implies a belief that I 
can, in some meaningful sense of the word (i.e., the weak sense), “access” 
both outcomes. Why else would I take the utilities of both into 
consideration?42 
This would not matter if Fischer had not wanted anything to do with 
EDT in the first place, and thus anything to do with decision-problems of 
the sort depicted above. But this would be quite an unreasonable position, 
since such decision-problems are very common. Fischer however makes it 
clear that he does intend, ultimately, to marry the dominance and the 
expected utility principles on the basis of his “accessibility”-informed 
approach. He says: 
                                                
41 In other words, the agent considers all such outcomes as being weakly accessible even though 
they are extensions of different pasts. 
42 By saying that an agent can access either outcome, I do not imply that the agent can now cause 
either outcome to obtain. The claim is weaker: by deciding to take the child to the doctor, I can 
consistently believe that I might return home either with a happy child, or after a futile drive. So, 
having decided to take my child to the doctor, say, and being unaware of whether the doctor is in 
his clinic, I consider both the happy -child and futile-drive outcomes simultaneously accessible. 
This may be considered an epistemic sense of  the word ‘accessible’. 
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[My approach] suggests a reconciliation of the apparently conflicting 
forms of reasoning issuing from the expected utility maximization 
approach and the dominance approach. Expected utility maximization 
should enjoin such maximization with regard to all relevant worlds, i.e., 
all those worlds to which the agent has access. And the intuitive picture 
of the fixity of the past suggests that an agent has access only to those 
possible worlds that are extensions of the actual world. This suggests that 
the expected utility approach should restrict the relevant options to those 
that follow paths that are extensions of the actual world. Given this 
natural and intuitive restriction, there is no conflict between employment 
of the principle of maximisation of expected utility and the dominance 
strategy pertinent to Newcomb’s Problem. (Fischer 1994, 102). 
 
But then the problem described above remains. Eschewing the weak sense 
of ‘accessibility’, what other sense of the word can Fischer call upon to 
handle the sort of case depicted above, consistent with his wish to preserve 
the broad idea of an expected utility calculation? The truthful answer is that 
I do not know, since Fischer does not discuss the matter anywhere in his 
book, and the passage above is maddeningly brief. The only possibility that 
comes to mind, in any event, is that Fischer means by an inaccessible 
outcome something like a “causally inaccessible” outcome. He writes, as 
we have seen: 
… it is reasonable to restrict one’s attention to those possible worlds one 
can actualize: the only reasons that are relevant to practical reasoning are 
reasons that obtain in the worlds one can actualize (or which are 
accessible to one). This idea, combined with the claim that one can only 
actualize those possible worlds which are extensions of our world (in the 
sense that they share the past of the actual world) allows us to resolve 
[these issues]. (ibid.) 
 
Presumably, the reason why only outcomes which are extensions of the 
actual past are “accessible” is that we have no causal power over the past, 
i.e., we cannot now cause the past to be otherwise than it actually is, and 
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thus we have no causal power to “put ourselves” into worlds which do not 
share the past of the actual world. 
 Fischer does not put it that way, but it is hard to think what other 
way he could put it, since he cannot simply be appealing to the “fixity” of 
the past in any causally-unqualified way, e.g., in the thin way in which the 
future is also “fixed”: this would be the sense in which there is only one 
(actual) future. For this sense of the “fixity” of the future is widely 
considered to be unable to support any interesting position. In fact, it 
generates the notorious (and fallacious) logical fatalism argument of which 
the following is an example. Relative, say, to my next wild motorbike ride: 
1. Either I will be killed in a crash or I will not 
2. If I will be killed in a crash, then any precaution I take (e.g., wearing a 
sturdy helmet) will be ineffective 
3. If I will not be killed in a crash, then any precaution I take will be 
redundant 
4. Any precaution I take will be ineffective or redundant (1, 2, 3) 
5. There is no point taking any precaution   (4) 
This argument executes dominance-style reasoning on a partition of 
possible future outcomes, following the “fixity” of the future in the thin 
sense mentioned above. Now, if I know in advance whether or not I would 
be killed in a crash (i.e., independently of whether I take any precaution), 
then the argument is hard to fault, as pointed out before with respect to the 
case of the past. But if I have no such talent for precognition, the argument 
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is quite flawed. In appealing to the “fixity” of the future, the logical fatalist 
ignores, to his peril, that present actions can causally influence future states 
of the world. From a decision-theoretic point of view, the fatalist argument 
is dominance reasoning gone awry, because the fatalist partitions the future 
in a way which fails to consider whether the states in question are 
“dependent” on the actions available to the agent.43 
So simply holding the past to be “fixed” or “determined” cannot be 
Fischer’s grounds for claiming that certain outcomes are inaccessible to an 
agent. The intuition cannot be simply that the past has already obtained, so 
we cannot access any outcome which does not share that past, but seems to 
have more to do with the fact that nothing one does now can have any 
causal influence over that past.44 If this is conceded, then Fischer’s 
inaccessibility principle comes down to this: only those outcomes are 
accessible to us which we can now bring about, holding the facts of the past 
constant. 
Unfortunately for Fischer, accepting this revision implies that he is 
merely reiterating what advocates of either Nozick Dominance or CDT 
would say. This sense of ‘inaccessibility’ is defeatist for Fischer since he 
                                                
43 Whether the nature of the dependence must be causal in order for it to constitute a basis for 
partitioning states of the world, or whether it is enough that it be probabilistic, I consider 
debatable, as discussed in chapter 1. The only thing relevant at this point is that the form of the 
logical fatalist argument is flawed. For a similar analysis of the logical fatalist argument, see 
Dummett (1964). 
44 This is the lay difference between our beliefs regarding the past and the future; we consider the 
past to be causally immune from the present, whereas, the future is thought to be affectable via 
present actions. The logical fatalist’s argument has no way of succeeding as he can make no sound 
appeal to the future’s possessing some such property of immunity; nevertheless, what one does in 
the present can be very plausibly regarded as ineffectual in causally altering the past. I say causally 
because Newcomb problems show how it is possible for the actual past, when unknown, to be 
probabilistically dependent on the present. 
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must now sacrifice his original intention of defending two-boxing without 
referring to the causal impact of the agent’s actions upon the state of box A. 
So, unless he is to make the error of the logical fatalist, I conclude that 
Fischer can maintain his position only by smuggling causal considerations 
in through the back door. 
Another way to see that it is hard for Fischer to avoid smuggling in 
causal considerations is to consider a version of Newcomb’s problem where 
the predictor makes his “prediction” only after the agent has made his 
decision, but without any communication occurring between the agent and 
the predictor. (The predictor is asked to delay his prediction for a week, 
say.) In this case, the agent’s decision has no more causal influence over the 
predictor’s prediction than in the original problem. But the difference is that 
Fischer can no longer prevent the agent from considering both the $1M and 
$1K outcomes to be “accessible” by him, since both of these outcomes 
(indeed all four possible outcomes) satisfy the condition, at the time of the 
agent’s decision, of being extensions of the agent’s past. The conclusion, as 
before, is that Fischer must in some way appeal to the causal independence 
of the agent’s actions and the states of box A to block the rationality of one-
boxing. 
In summary, I think that Fischer is either unsuccessful in dealing 
with the paradox or he must consider, after all, the causal efficacy of the 
agent’s actions on the state of box A. In the latter case, recalling our 
discussion of counterfactuals and causation in section 1, it still remains to 
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be justified why such causal considerations are crucial. I will address this 
issue further in Chapter 4, but it is useful first to examine a theoretical 
framework (CDT) that deliberately incorporates the notion of the causal 
efficacy of an agent’s actions into a rational decision procedure. 
3.3. CDT and EDT: paradox regained 
 I mentioned in Chapter 1, that when the predictor is known to make 
the occasional mistake, one-boxers rely on the principle of maximising 
expected utility, where expected utility is calculated using the relevant 
action-state conditional probabilities as weights. I also stated that this way 
of calculating expected-utility is christened V-maximisation by Gibbard and 
Harper, and constitutes the core of Evidential Decision Theory, or EDT. 
Newcomb’s problem (and decision problems like it) creates a 
paradox as EDT’s recommendation to one-box conflicts with the 
recommendation of Nozick Dominance to two-box, even as both EDT and 
Nozick Dominance agree on the rational course of action in non-Newcomb-
contexts, so far as it is known. Naturally, then, a two-boxer will contend 
that EDT, or V-maximisation, must be in some essential way misguided. 
For an objection of this nature to succeed, it must be shown why the method 
is fallacious; also, though this is not essential, some new principle should be 
suggested in its place for decision-contexts where there is no dominant 
action. The combination of Nozick Dominance and this new principle, in 
addition to concurring on the rationality of two-boxing in Newcomb’s 
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problem, should also confirm what is clearly intuited to be the rational act 
in other decision-contexts. 
 As mentioned in Chapter 1, Gibbard and Harper’s objection to V-
maximisation rests on the claim that the use of conditional probabilities as 
weights does not measure the genuine expected utility of an agent’s action, 
as conditional probabilities say nothing about the causal link between 
actions and outcomes. Rather, V-maximisation simply tells the agent the 
welcomeness of the news of the performance of the said action: 
We can now ask whether U or V is more properly called the utility of an 
act. The answer seems clearly to be U. The ‘utility’ of an act should be 
its expected genuine efficacy in bringing about states of affairs the agent 
wants, not the degree to which news of the act ought to cheer the agent. 
Since U-utility is a matter of what the act can be expected to bring about 
whereas V-utility is a matter of the welcomeness of news, U-utility seems 
best to capture the notion of utility. (1978, 140) 
 
If V-utility measures the news value of the action, then I should welcome 
the news that I took only A more than the news that I took both boxes. 
Nevertheless, it is argued that since the genuine expected utility, or U-utility, 
as laid down by CDT favours taking both boxes, it is rational in Newcomb’s 
problem to take both boxes. 
 It seems to me that this line of reasoning merely shifts the paradox 
onto a different ground. The onus is on the two-boxer now to explain how, 
given a choice between two courses of action, it can be rational to perform 
the action, the news of whose performance will make one less happy. This 
suggestion seems to be extremely counter intuitive, and nothing in what 
Gibbard and Harper say accounts for this. For example, Jeffrey writes: 
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If an agent is deliberating about performing act A or act B, and if AB is 
impossible, there is no effective difference between asking whether he 
prefers A to B as a news item or as an act, for he makes the news. (1965, 
73-4) 
and Gibbard and Harper reply: 
… it may sometimes be rational for an agent to choose an act B instead 
of an act A even though he may welcome the news of A more than that of 
B. The news of an act may furnish evidence of a state of the world which 
the act itself is known not to produce. In that case, though the agent 
indeed makes the news of his act, he does not make the news that his act 
bespeaks. (ibid., 140) 
 
But, to this, it may be replied, in turn, that even though the agent does not 
make the news that his act bespeaks, the very act of his making the news 
belies what the act does not bespeak. So the paradox is quite acute. 
 I now turn to the claim that the appropriate measure of the expected 
utility of an action should incorporate a notion of how causally effective the 
action is in materialising various relevant outcomes (or states of the world). 
As I explained in Chapter 1, section 7, Gibbard and Harper attempt to do 
this by using the unconditional probability of the relevant action-state 
counterfactuals as weights in the expected-utility calculation. The claim 
underlying this technique is allegedly that, for any action-state 
counterfactual A □→ S, say, the expression P(A □→ S) is equal to the 
agent’s degree of belief that doing A will bring about the state S. In line 
with my complaint in section 1 of this chapter, however, A □→ S represents 
a causal connection between A and S if and only if the standard-resolution is 
legitimately applied in determining whether A □→ S is true. I noted also 
that there are cases (Newcomb’s problem is one) where it is not clear that 
the standard-resolution is to be preferred over its backtracking counterpart. 
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Until this controversy regarding the appropriate resolution of “vagueness” 
surrounding counterfactuals is settled, the claim of CDT to be calculating 
the “expected genuine efficacy” of an act in “bringing about states of affairs 
the agent wants” is unwarranted. 
 One final issue with CDT must be mentioned. If Newcomb’s 
predictor is taken to be infallible (or even inerrant), then, by the admission 
of several proponents of two boxing themselves, the intuition for taking A 
alone becomes very strong. For example, Nozick himself says: 
If the fact that it is almost certain that the predictor will be correct is 
crucial to Newcomb’s example, this suggests that we consider the case 
where it is certain, where you know the prediction is correct (though you 
do not know what the prediction is). Here one naturally argues: I know 
that if I take both, I will get $1,000. I know that if I take only what is in 
the second, I get $M. So, of course, I will take only what is in the second. 
And does a proponent of taking what is in both boxes in Newcomb’s 
example (e.g., me) really wish to argue that it is the probability, however 
minute, of the predictor’s being mistaken which makes the difference? 
Does he really wish to argue that if he knows the prediction will be 
correct, he will take only the second, but that if he knows someone using 
the predictor’s theory will be wrong once in every 20 billion cases, he 
will take what is in both boxes? Could the difference between one in n, 
and none in n, for arbitrarily large finite n, make this difference? (Nozick 
1969, 71) 
 
The problem is that, even in this extreme case, CDT counterintuitively 
suggests that the agent ought to take both boxes. Especially in this last case, 
it is hard to believe that causal considerations should play a major role, if 
any role at all, in the process of arriving at the rational decision. 
  In my final chapter, I consider how causal considerations might be 
dispensed with altogether, in so far as decision-making is concerned, and 
attempt to sketch an alternative theoretical framework (different from both 
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EDT and CDT), for understanding and resolving decision problems. 
Essentially, I dispense with both conditional probabilities and 







4. Material conditionals and decision-making 
 In the previous chapter, I discussed why certain arguments for two-
boxing are not persuasive. It was shown that no clear insight into the 
paradox is gained when the conditional premises in the one-box and two-
box arguments are read as counterfactuals. Instead, one gets embroiled in an 
unwieldy metaphysical debate concerning how possible worlds should be 
ordered for “closeness”. More critically, using counterfactuals leads a two-
boxer to the counterintuitive conclusion that it is rational to take both boxes 
even when the predictor is known to be inerrant. 
In Chapter 2, I proposed a reading of the problem on which one-
boxing turns out pretty much immediately to be the rational decision, but 
also promised not to let my whole case hang on it. In this chapter, I propose 
the general and, perhaps surprising, claim that it is material conditionals 
(rather than either conditional probabilities or counterfactual conditionals) 
which can supply a sound theoretical basis for making rational decisions. I 
argue that this way of approaching Newcomb’s problem also justifies one-
boxing. The model of decision-making that I will propose will issue in 
prescriptions which generally match those of EDT. I discuss this 
convergence of prescriptions in the final section of this chapter. 
4.1. Can material conditionals ground decisions? 
 My suggestion that the conditional premises in Arguments 1 and 2 of 
the previous chapter be treated as material conditionals represents a 
possible way out of the mess that counterfactuals lead us to. I begin by 
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restating, in a simpler form, using material conditionals, the argument for 
taking A alone in the case of an inerrant predictor: 
Argument O (One-box) 
1. I take A alone ⊃ I get $M 
2. I take both boxes ⊃ I get $K 
3. I prefer getting $M to getting $K 
C. I should take A alone                   (1, 2, 3) 
I note first that premises 1 and 2 of this argument are beyond dispute. This 
is since both one-boxers and two-boxers agree that, in the case of an 
inerrant predictor: 
P(I get $M/I take A alone) = 1 
P(I get $K/I take both boxes) = 1 
And it is easily shown that the unconditional probability of a material 
conditional is at least as high as the corresponding conditional probability.45 
Therefore, premises 1 and 2 above are, in fact, known for certain. 
What is questionable, however, is the wisdom of inferring the 
conclusion that one ought to take A alone based on the three premises given, 
the third of which, incidentally, may be stipulated to be true. The argument 
above may be thought to be invalid, even though the intuitive attractiveness 
                                                
45 P(A ⊃ S) = P(~A) +  P(S/A) ⋅ P(A). Therefore: 
 
P(A ⊃ S) – P(S/A) 
= P(~A) +  P(S/A) ⋅ P(A) – P(S/A) 
= P(~A) – P(S/A) ⋅ (1 – P(A))  
= P(~A) ⋅ (1 – P(S/A)) 
≥ 0. 
 
Therefore, P(A ⊃ S)  ≥ P(S/A). 
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of one-boxing in the face of an inerrant predictor is overwhelming. That the 
argument, as it stands, is invalid can be seen by considering a similar case. 
Suppose I believe, as I do, that I will not slap the Head of the Philosophy 
department at any time. I then believe this material conditional to be true:  
I slap the Head ⊃ He gives me a nine-course dinner at the Hyatt. 
I also know that the Head has just published a well-received book, and, on 
the basis of my familiarity with his behaviour over a considerable period of 
time46, I also believe this material conditional:  
I congratulate the head ⊃ He treats me to coffee in the canteen. 
Now, as I am entering the department, I see the Head walking towards me 
and I reason as follows: 
Argument B (Bad argument) 
1. I slap the head ⊃ I get dinner at Hyatt 
2. I congratulate the head ⊃ I get coffee at the canteen 
3. I prefer dinner at Hyatt to coffee at the canteen 
C. I should slap the head     (1, 2, 3) 
This shares the form of Argument O. The material conditionals 1 and 2 in 
Argument B are true for reasons mentioned previously and 3 expresses my 
preference for the one outcome over the other. But, surely, this is not a good 
argument for slapping the Head of the Philosophy department. 
                                                
46 This could include my having heard trustworthy accounts of the Head having behaved similarly 
with different people who congratulated him at different times, or, it could be a department 
tradition to behave in such manner and I know the Head to be a stickler for tradition, etc. 
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The problem is that premise 1 of Argument B is believed to be true 
for the “trivial” reason that I believe its antecedent to be false. A possibility 
of this sort always exists where a material conditional is concerned. This 
seems to be why Horgan insists that the conditionals in the one-boxer’s 
argument should be read counterfactually, and not materially: 
… it is crucial to interpret them as having the logical form of 
counterfactual conditionals rather than mere material conditionals. For 
suppose I believe that I will in fact choose [box A alone] and that I will 
in fact get $1 million. Then I believe the following material conditionals: 
I choose both boxes ⊃ I get $1,000. 
I choose [box A alone] ⊃ I get $1 million. 
Yet I also might believe, despite [these material conditionals], that if I 
were to choose both boxes then I would get $1,001,000. If so, then surely 
it isn’t true that I ought to choose [box A alone]. (Horgan 1981, 332) 
 
However, I contend that Horgan is too hasty to dismiss the 
formulation of the one-boxer’s argument in terms of material conditionals. 
Let us say that ‘A ⊃ S’ is trivially believed to be true (or that one has trivial 
reasons for believing ‘A ⊃ S’) if ‘A ⊃ S’ is believed to be true either 
because ‘A’ is believed to be false, or because ‘S’ is believed to be true, or 
both. If ‘A ⊃ S’ is believed to be true on any other grounds, let us say that it 
is non-trivially believed to be true (or that one has non-trivial reasons for 
believing it.)47 What Horgan misses is that the reason why Argument B is 
bad, as expressed in the first part of his passage, does not apply to 
Argument O. Premises 1 and 2 of Argument O are non-trivially believed to 
be true, for the agent’s belief in those premises derives from his certainty 
that the predictor will in fact correctly predict his choice. In other words, the 
                                                
47 One might have both trivial and non-trivial reasons for believing a material conditional. I will 
discuss this important complication in section 4.3. 
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agent does not believe 1 to be true either because he believes that he will 
not choose A alone, or because he believes that there is a million dollars in 
A. (Likewise for premise 2 of Argument O.) Suppose we add an extra 
premise to Argument O which recognizes this fact: 
Improved Argument O 
1. I take A alone ⊃ I get $M 
2. I take both boxes ⊃ I get $K 
3. I prefer getting $M to getting $K 
4. I have non-trivial reasons for 1 and 2 
C. I should take A alone                 (1, 2, 3, 4) 
Then this argument is no longer subject to the criticism mentioned above. 
Is this a good argument for one-boxing? 
 The only other type of criticism that can be made against it, so far as 
I know, has effectively been addressed in the previous chapter. This is the 
criticism, mentioned also in Horgan’s passage, that 1 and 2 above “conflict” 
with the following comparative counterfactual: 
I would get more money if I were to take both boxes than if I were to 
take A alone 
which seems to favour two-boxing, and which the two-boxer contends is 
true on the grounds that there is more money in both boxes than in box A 
alone, whatever the content of box A. My response to this was that this 
counterfactual presupposes the controversial standard-resolution, and thus 
fails to advance the two-boxer’s case. (It is not clear whether the 
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counterfactual is true.) So it cannot here be used to counter Improved 
Argument O. The point, as already mentioned, is to avoid the counterfactual 
quagmire. 
 I think that Improved Argument O is quite irresistible, but let me try 
to explain this further. The use of conditional premises in decision-making 
(whatever the nature of the conditionals) is attributable to the decision-
maker’s need to establish “links” between various actions open to him and 
possible outcomes which may transpire.48 Faced with a choice between 
actions A and not-A (say), while accepting the conditionals, ‘If A then S’ 
and ‘If not-A, then not-S’, the agent may imagine himself in confrontation 
with a choice between “actualising” a world in which S is true, and 
“actualising” a world in which not-S is true. Assuming that the agent knows 
whether he would prefer an S world or a not-S world to be actual, the 
conditional premises allow him to reduce his choice between doing A and 
doing not-A to a choice between being in an S world and being in a not-S 
world. In short, the agent may think of doing A as “actualising” an S world, 
and of doing not-A as “actualising” a not-S world. 
 Advocates of counterfactual premises construe the term “actualise” 
to carry a causal burden. It is argued, as it were, that an agent “actualises” a 
desirable possible world by causing it, by his action, to become actual. For 
instance, if the agent prefers an S world to a not-S world, then it is rational 
for him to do A so as to bring about the S world, it is claimed. Now, if the 
                                                
48 As mentioned in Chapter 3, the dispute between one-boxers and two-boxers (in particular) and 
EDT and CDT (in general) concerns the nature of these links, whether they should be of a 
probabilistic or causal nature. 
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notion of “actualising” just made out must be understood to carry a causal 
burden in this way, then the insistence that the conditional premises of 
decision-making be counterfactuals is perhaps justified, provided it could 
also be shown why such a causal burden must necessarily be placed upon 
the notion of “actualising”, as well as that an action-state counterfactual ‘A 
□→ S’ invariably incorporates a claim that A causes S. I have emphasized at 
some length in the previous chapter the problems associated with 
establishing the second claim. 
 As for the first claim, I do not find it reasonable to think that to 
“actualise” a world is to cause it to become actual, or, in more neutral terms, 
that “actualising” is obliged to carry any causal burden. The only kind of 
justification that is offered to convince someone to be partial to this view, 
so far as I know, constitutes an appeal to intuition. Take the following 
example of an ordinary decision-making situation: I am rushing to finish a 
project due at 8 am tomorrow. It is now 11 pm and I know that I will have 
to slog through the night to stand any chance of meeting the deadline. A 
crucial promotion hinges on my completing the project on time, and, all 
things considered I would rather complete it on time than not. Just as I am 
about to take a break for a resolve-hardening coffee and a smoke, my 
equally diligent colleague turns up to suggest a couple of drinks at the pub 
round the corner. Now, even though I am always man enough for a drink or 
two, I know that drinking always causes me to be groggy; in fact, it has 
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quite the reverse effect on me than coffee. Given all this, I quite reasonably 
believe these counterfactuals: 
I drink coffee □→ I will finish my project on time 
I drink alcohol □→ I will not finish my project on time. 
Believing these counterfactuals is equivalent, I am willing to agree in the 
present instance, to believing that drinking coffee will cause a world to 
become actual where I sit refreshed to work through the night, and that 
drinking alcohol will cause a world to become actual where the project 
remains unfinished at the deadline. Given that I prefer the first world, I 
should then drink coffee. 
 This line of reasoning is fairly convincing from an intuitive 
standpoint, motivating the suggestion that “actualising” a world must 
indeed carry some kind of causal burden. The problem arises, however, 
when one considers off-beat cases where the agent harbours no such belief 
regarding the causal influence of actions on outcomes. Newcomb’s problem 
is one such case, but let me provide another. Assume me to be a 4-D addict; 
whenever I get a chance, I buy 4-D tickets. Over many instances in the past, 
I have observed that every time I check the lottery results over the internet, I 
do not win, whereas every time I check the results in the local newspaper, I 
always win some prize. Based on this evidence, I duly believe the following 
conditionals: 
If I check the results over the internet, then I will not win a prize 
If I check the results in the paper, then I will win a prize. 
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This does not mean that I believe in the relevant causal connections: as I am 
imagining the example, I do not believe that my checking the results in the 
newspaper (or over the internet) causes me to win a prize (or not to win). So 
I cannot read these conditionals counterfactually, if I agree that they give 
me good reason to check the newspaper rather than the internet the next 
time I buy a 4-D ticket, but must read them in some other way (e.g., 
materially). Someone might suggest that, in the situation described, I do not 
have good reason to check the newspaper rather than the internet, precisely 
because I do not believe in the relevant causal connections. But I find this 
hard to swallow. Intuitively, I think that nobody could, with sincerity, fail to 
be moved by the sort of evidence imagined above. Dummett gives a similar 
example: 
Imagine that I find that if I utter the word ‘Click!’ before opening an 
envelope, that envelope never turns out to contain a bill; having made 
this discovery, I keep up the practice for several months, and upon 
investigation can unearth no ordinary reason for my having received no 
bill during that period. It would then not be irrational for me to utter the 
word ‘Click!’ before opening an envelope in order that the letter should 
not be a bill; it would be superstitious in no stronger sense than that in 
which belief in causal laws is superstitious. Someone might argue: either 
the envelope contains a bill, or it does not; your uttering the word 
‘Click!’ is therefore either redundant or fruitless. I am not however 
necessarily asserting that my uttering the word ‘Click!’ changes a bill 
into a letter from a friend … Nothing can alter the fact that if one were 
really to have strong grounds for believing in such a regularity as this, 
and no alternative (causal) explanation for it, then it could not but be 
rational to believe in it and to make use of it. (Dummett 1954, 332) 
 
The point is that the requirement that conditionals in decision-contexts must 
be treated as counterfactuals (with causal import) fails to intuitively 
convince. It only convinces because we fail to consider off-beat examples. 
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 On the other hand, if the conditionals in question are treated as 
material conditionals, then I contend that they can adequately ground 
decisions provided simply that they are not believed for “trivial” reasons. 
For example, the conditional ‘I slap the Head ⊃ I get dinner at Hyatt’ is 
hardly indicative of my belief that by slapping the Head, I will “actualise” a 
world in which the Head feeds me sumptuously at Hyatt, but merely reveals 
my belief that I will not actually slap the Head. In the coffee-alcohol and the 
4-D examples, however, the conditionals, if treated as material conditionals, 
satisfy the stated condition. In both instances, they also prescribe what is 
intuitively rational to do; namely, to drink coffee instead of alcohol, and to 
check the newspapers rather than the internet, respectively. Considering 
both the ordinary and the off-beat cases then, on intuitive grounds, the case 
for a counterfactual as opposed to a material reading of the crucial 
conditionals in decision-contexts is hardly persuasive. 
 It is worth mentioning that the intuition in favour of the 
counterfactual/causal reading of the conditionals, in the coffee-alcohol sort 
of example, can be accounted for in a fairly simple way, on my view. Since 
any counterfactual conditional implies its material counterpart49, I suggest, 
for example, that my belief in the counterfactuals: 
I drink coffee □→ I will finish my project on time 
I drink alcohol □→ I will not finish my project on time   
                                                
49 For example, within a “possible worlds” framework, ‘A □→ S’ is true if and only if S is true in 
the closest possible world where A is true. Assuming that the closest possible world where A is true 
is just the actual world if A is in fact true (a widely-held assumption), then ‘A □→ S’ implies that 
either ‘A’ is false, or else ‘S’ is true; that is to say, it implies ‘A ⊃ S’. 
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leads me to believe, non-trivially, the corresponding material conditionals:  
I drink coffee ⊃ I will finish my project on time 
I drink alcohol ⊃ I will not finish my project on time   
and that these (non-trivially believed) material conditionals are the real 
basis for the intuitive appeal of drinking coffee. By this suggestion, the 
essential consideration is whether my decision to drink coffee is based on 
material conditionals which are non-trivially believed to be true; the 
counterfactuals themselves serve no purpose except to allow me to extract 
the corresponding material conditionals. In normal decision-contexts, where 
actions are believed to causally influence outcomes, it is of no practical 
consequence whether the agent uses the counterfactuals or the (non-trivially 
believed) material conditionals as a guide to rational decision; both methods 
agree on what is rational to do. This may be the provenance of the illusion 
that intuition favours the use of counterfactuals in decision-contexts. 
By denying the relevance of counterfactuals in this way, by treating 
the notion of the causal efficacy of an action in bringing about an outcome 
as an optional extra, so to speak, I close the doors on the possibility of 
explaining the notion of “actualising” a possible world in terms of causing 
it to become actual. Yet it does seem that when I consider the notion of 
acting in a way so as to “actualise” a desirable possible world, I believe the 
act to be invested with some sort of power. I prefer, on account of my own 
inability to define this power, to let the term “actualising” remain 
unanalysed. This does handicap my theory, but not substantially, I claim, in 
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comparison to one which advocates the necessity of considering the causal 
efficacy of my action. It is not as if the notion of causal power is clearly 
comprehended. At the worst, the principle I am suggesting, on which it is 
(non-trivially believed) material conditionals which are crucial to decision-
making, fares as well as the causal-based, or counterfactual-based, decision 
principle; at best, it does better. 
 If it is conceded that non-trivially-believed material conditionals can 
ground rational decisions in this way, then Improved Argument O seems to 
me a correct and irrefutable argument for one-boxing, at least in the case of 
an inerrant predictor. (I will discuss the case of an errant predictor below.) 
4.2. Is there a comparable two-boxing argument?  
 I think it is worth the while to consider now whether the two-boxer 
can regenerate the paradox by formulating a parallel argument for two-
boxing, based likewise on non-trivially-believed material conditionals. This 
would show that the descent from counterfactuals to material conditionals, 
far from representing any insightful gain, simply leaves the paradox intact. 
 Following Argument 2 of the previous chapter, a natural presentation 
of the two-boxer’s argument would be as under: 
Argument T (Two-box) 
1. Either: 
(I take A alone ⊃ I get $1M) and (I take both boxes ⊃ I get $1M+$1K)  
or else:  
(I take A alone ⊃ I get $0) and (I take both boxes ⊃ I get $1K) 
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2. I prefer getting more money to less money 
C. I should take both boxes 
Premise 1 must be accepted since box B is known to contain $1K, whereas 
box A is known to contain either $1M or $0. But the argument, as it stands, 
is invalid, since we could just as well argue: 
Argument L (Lousy argument) 
1. Either: 
(I slap the Head ⊃ I get dinner) and (I don’t slap him ⊃ I get coffee)  
or else: 
(I slap the Head ⊃ I get bread) and (I don’t slap him ⊃ I get water) 
2. I prefer food to drink 
C. I should slap the Head. 
Since I know that I will not slap the Head and I always drink coffee anyway, 
then the first disjunct of 1 (and, therefore, 1 itself) is known to be true, and 
2 may be stipulated to be true, but C obviously still does not follow. But 
this argument has the same form as Argument T, so both arguments are 
invalid. 
The two-boxer may point out that Argument L deserves its title only 
because premise 1 of Argument L is believed for a “trivial” reason, whereas 
this is not true of premise 1 of Argument T, which is known to be true in 
advance of knowing the truth-value of any of the antecedents or the 
consequents of the various material conditionals within it. But even granted 
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this sense in which premise 1 of Argument T is known “non-trivially” to be 
true, does the argument then become valid? Consider: 
Improved Argument T 
1. Either: 
(I take A alone ⊃ I get $1M) and (I take both boxes ⊃ I get $1M+$1K)  
or else:  
(I take A alone ⊃ I get $0) and (I take both boxes ⊃ I get $1K) 
2. I prefer getting more money to less money 
3. I have non-trivial reasons for 1 
C. I should take both boxes A and B 
I contend that Improved Argument T remains invalid, even though it is true 
that the agent has non-trivial reasons for believing 1, in the sense explained 
above. The problem is that, in precisely the same sense, the agent also has 
non-trivial reasons for believing this disjunction: 
1*. Either: 
(I take A alone ⊃ I get $M) & (I take both boxes ⊃ I get $2K) 
or else: 
(I take A alone ⊃ I get $0) & (I take both boxes ⊃ I lose $2K) 
or else: 
(I take A alone ⊃ I get $2M) & (I take both boxes ⊃ I get $1M+$1K) 
or else: 
(I take A alone ⊃ I get $2K) & (I take both boxes ⊃ I get $1K). 
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Knowing simply that box B contains $1K, and that box A contains either 
$M or $0, it is not difficult to see that the agent can be non-trivially certain, 
in exactly the same sense, that at least one of the above disjuncts is true, and 
thus that the disjunction itself is true. But in that case, just as 1, 2 and 3 of 
Improved Argument T is meant to favour taking both boxes, then 1*, 2 and 
3 must in the same way favour taking A alone, which would be 
contradictory advice. So premise 3 does not seem strong enough to make 
Improved Argument T valid. 
It is not hard to see where the problem lies. Premise 1 of Argument T 
essentially takes the following general form: 
(∃x)(∃y)((I take A alone ⊃ I get $x) and (I take both boxes ⊃ I get $y) 
and (x < y)) 
But there are bound to be many arbitrary values of x and y such that all 
three conditions in this statement are true, and, in particular, x < y. For 
example, I picked such arbitrary values for the four “bogus” material 
conditionals in 1* above: 
I take both boxes ⊃ I get $2K 
I take both boxes ⊃ I lose $2K 
I take A alone ⊃ I get $2M  
I take A alone ⊃ I get $2K 
The point is that these “bogus” conditionals do not stop 1* from being non-
trivially known for certain to be true. Can the two-boxer impose further 
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restrictions in order to block such bogus conditionals from entering into 1*, 
thereby blocking my counterexample altogether? 
Let me consider a couple of possible responses that the two-boxer 
might make. He might first argue that the scope of the non-trivial belief in 
question be shifted from the disjunction 1* as a whole to each of its 
disjuncts. He now requires that each of these statements: 
(I take A alone ⊃ I get $M) & (I take both boxes ⊃ I get $2K) 
(I take A alone ⊃ I get $0) & (I take both boxes ⊃ I lose $2K) 
(I take A alone ⊃ I get $2M) & (I take both boxes ⊃ I get $1M+$1K) 
(I take A alone ⊃ I get $2K) & (I take both boxes ⊃ I get $1K). 
be non-trivially believed to be true, i.e., be believed without recourse to a 
belief about what I will do, or how much money I will get. This response 
does block me from using 1* but it also blocks the two-boxer from his own 
argument, since he does not have non-trivial grounds for each of these 
statements either, which are the disjuncts of his statement 1: 
(I take A alone ⊃ I get $1M) and (I take both boxes ⊃ I get $1M+$1K)  
(I take A alone ⊃ I get $0) and (I take both boxes ⊃ I get $1K) 
In fact, this was precisely why he needed to use a disjunction in the first 
place, to formulate his statement 1. 
A second strategy open to the two-boxer is to assert that only those 
material conditionals be allowed into 1* which the agent believes to express 
some possible causal connection between antecedent and consequent, i.e., it 
is not ruled out by anything that the agent knows that the antecedent and the 
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consequent of the material conditional in question are causally connected. 
This will also block my use of 1*, since, for example, I know that no value 
of $2M is running about anywhere in Newcomb’s problem, so there is no 
question of my being caused to get $2M by the act of taking A alone. (I 
refer to the third of the four “bogus” material conditional displayed above.) 
However, this suggestion defeats the whole purpose of using material 
conditionals in the argument. This suggestion translates into saying that the 
conditional premises in the two-box argument must be read, after all, as 
standard-resolution counterfactuals, whereas the whole point of resorting to 
material conditionals was to avoid the counterfactual stalemate discussed in 
the previous chapter. 
I cannot see any other recourse for the two-boxer, so I conclude that 
he has no good argument comparable to that of the one-boxer’s when the 
conditional premises in the Newcomb arguments are read as material 
conditionals. So he does not succeed in regenerating the paradox after all. 
 I would now like to extend the scope of section 4.1 by showing how 
the agent can continue to use material conditionals to justify a decision to 
one-box even when he is uncertain of the predictor’s accuracy, i.e., even 
when the predictor is not inerrant, but is known occasionally to err in his 
predictions. For this more general problem, which is in fact Newcomb’s 
original problem, premises 1 and 2 of: 
Improved Argument O 
1. I take A alone ⊃ I get $M 
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2. I take both boxes ⊃ I get $K 
3. I prefer getting $M to getting $K 
4. I have non-trivial reasons for 1 and 2 
C. I should take A alone                 (1, 2, 3, 4) 
are no longer known for certain, but are accepted only to a certain degree of 
probability. In the next section, drawing upon the discussion supplied above, 
I provide a general theoretical framework for decision-making with material 
conditionals which is able to accommodate a complication of this sort. I 
will first lay out the general framework before discussing it in the context of 
Newcomb’s problem. 
4.3. Material Decision Theory 
 I argued above that one should one-box when faced with an infallible 
(or even inerrant) predictor, owing to one’s non-trivial certainty in these 
material conditionals: 
I take A alone ⊃ I get $M 
I take both boxes ⊃ I get $K 
There are two elements here: first, that one accepts these conditionals non-
trivially; second, that one is certain of them. It becomes important to 
consider these two elements separately when, as in Newcomb’s original 
problem, the predictor can no longer be said to be inerrant, i.e., when one 
can no longer be certain that the material conditionals are true. How should 
one’s lack of certainty in the material conditionals affect Improved 
Argument O? This is the question that I wish to address in this section. 
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Suppose that one believes a certain material conditional ‘A ⊃ S’ to 
some degree d, where 0 ≤ d ≤ 1. I will aim to partition the value of d into 
“trivial” and “non-trivial” numerical components, corresponding to this 
(qualitative) definition previously supplied: 
‘A ⊃ S’ is trivially believed to be true if ‘A ⊃ S’ is believed to be true 
either because ‘A’ is believed to be false, or else because ‘S’ is believed 
to be true, or else both; whereas ‘A ⊃ S’ is non-trivially believed to be 
true if it is believed to be true on other grounds, i.e., on the grounds that 
there is a “connection” of some sort between ‘A’ and ‘S’.50 
The issue arises because it is possible to have both trivial and non-trivial 
reasons for believing that a material conditional is true. Consider this 
example: 
Bush wins the upcoming election ⊃ The world degenerates into chaos 
I believe this conditional (to some degree) partly because I believe (to some 
degree) that Bush won’t win the upcoming election, partly because I believe 
(to some degree) that, independently of whether Bush wins the election, the 
world degenerates into chaos anyway, and partly because I believe (to some 
degree) in the existence of a “connection” between Bush’s winning the 
election and the world spinning into chaos. Following the definition above, 
the first two contributions to my overall degree of belief in the material 
conditional are trivial whereas the third contribution is non-trivial. But one 
would like to ask how much triviality or non-triviality, overall, there is in 
                                                
50 Alternatively, I will say that one has trivial reasons for believing ‘A ⊃ S’ in the first case, as 
opposed to non-trivial reasons in the second. 
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my belief in the stated material conditional? Can we quantify the trivial and 
non-trivial contributions just noted? 
Likewise, in Newcomb’s problem, if the agent accepts the first of 
these material conditionals: 
I take A alone ⊃ I get $M 
I take both boxes ⊃ I get $K 
to degree 0.9, say, then this value is grounded in both trivial and non-trivial 
reasons he may have for his belief in that conditional. It seems desirable to 
find a way of separating these grounds in the hope of extracting a numerical 
measure of the agent’s decision-relevant degree of belief (let us say) in that 
conditional, and likewise for the second conditional. This measure can then 
serve as a rational basis for his choosing between taking A alone and taking 
both boxes. In fact, it also proves necessary to examine, in a parallel way, 
the agent’s degree of belief in these conditionals: 
I take A alone ⊃ I get $0 
I take both boxes ⊃ I get $M+$K. 
Or consider a more general decision-context where the agent has a 
choice between performing actions A and not-A, where exactly one of the 
states S or not-S may transpire, whichever action he chooses to perform. I 
will construct a model of rational decision-making for such an agent, based 
on his decision-relevant degree of belief in these four material conditionals: 
A ⊃ S 
A ⊃ ~S 
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~A ⊃ S 
~A ⊃ ~S 
I emphasize again that it is not the agent’s degree of belief in these material 
conditionals per se that should guide his decision, but his decision-relevant 
degree of belief in them. The problem I am concerned with in this section is 
to arrive at a numerical measure of this notion. We expect that his decision-
relevant degree of belief in any given material conditional is tied up largely 
with his non-trivial reasons for believing that conditional, but I will show 
that it is also tied up to some extent with his trivial reasons for believing it. I 
will assume, following the Bayesian school of probability, that one’s degree 
of belief in a proposition may be expressed by the subjective probability 
value that one ascribes to that proposition.51 
Generally speaking, as in the Bush example above, the degree of belief 
that an agent has in ‘A ⊃ S’ may be attributed to three different sources: 
A belief (to whatever degree) that A is false 
A belief (to whatever degree) that S is true 
A belief in some “connection” (to whatever degree) between A and S  
Corresponding to these sources, let us hypothesise these three entities: 
P~A(A ⊃ S) = the degree to which ‘A ⊃ S’ is trivially believed as a result 
of the first source above 
PS(A ⊃ S) = the degree to which ‘A ⊃ S’ is trivially believed as a result of 
the second source 
                                                
51 Generalising the framework of decision-making that I provide here is beyond the scope of this 
work. 
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Pn(A ⊃ S) = the degree to which ‘A ⊃ S’ is non-trivially believed as a 
result of the third source 
such that: 
P(A ⊃ S) = P~A(A ⊃ S) + PS(A ⊃ S) + Pn(A ⊃ S). 
The term on the left in this equation refers to the agent’s overall degree of 
belief in ‘A ⊃ S’. The three other terms refer to hypothesised entities in the 
sense that I hypothesise their existence in the attempt to give them 
numerical meaning. The subsequent aim is to isolate the “decision-relevant” 
components from among them. 
For the purposes of decision-making, the first value P~A(A ⊃ S) is 
clearly irrelevant, since, no matter how strongly you believe that ~A, this 
will not reflect any belief on your part that performing A will “actualise” S, 
as I have illustrated by a previous example.52 We can afford to ignore this 
value for now. The remaining two values, however, are highly relevant. The 
third value Pn(A ⊃ S) is reflective of a belief that A will “actualise” S, since 
it arises out of a belief in some “connection” between A and S. I will show 
below that the second value PS(A ⊃ S) is also relevant, since it may be 
understood to reflect a belief that A will “actualise” S by accident, as it 
were. 
 I begin by discussing the third value Pn(A ⊃ S), the degree to which 
the agent non-trivially believes ‘A ⊃ S’, as a result of his belief in some 
                                                
52 As mentioned before, the conditional ‘I slap the Head ⊃ I get dinner at Hyatt’ is hardly 
indicative of my belief that by slapping the Head, I will “actualise” a world in which the Head 
feeds me sumptuously at Hyatt, but merely reveals my belief that I will not actually slap the Head. 
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“connection” between A and S. Talk of belief in a “connection” between the 
antecedent and the consequent of a material conditional is not unfamiliar. 
For example, Quine says: 
Only those conditionals are worth affirming which follow from some 
manner of relevance between antecedent and consequent—some law, 
perhaps, connecting the matters which these component statements 
describe. But such connection underlies the useful application of the 
conditional without needing to participate in its meaning. Such 
connection underlies the useful application of the conditional even 
though the meaning of the conditional be understood precisely as 
‘~(p·~q)’. (Quine 1974, 16, my italics) 
 
But it also seems meaningful to speak of the strength of an agent’s belief in 
such a connection, in terms of a numerical value which he is willing to 
attribute to that connection. Let us call this value c, where 0 ≤ c ≤ 1. As an 
example, consider the evergreen: 
It is raining ⊃ The streets are wet. 
It appears possible for someone incarcerated in a dungeon, without any 
means of accessing information either about the meteorological conditions 
outside his cell or about the state of the streets in the vicinity, to have a 
particular, and plausibly high, value for c. If he is a normal person with 
general knowledge, then his value for c will be close to, if not exactly equal 
to 1, to reflect his near certainty that rain will cause the streets to be wet. 
  Additional information that he comes to acquire might change his 
value for c, in a way depending on the nature of that information: in this 
case, I think that it would just depend on whether it leads him to consider 
rain to be less or more potent now in causing the streets to be wet. For 
example, if he comes to learn of a mechanism in operation, triggered off by 
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rain, which leads to a canopy’s opening up over the streets, then he would 
now judge rain to be less effective in wetting the streets. The degree to 
which he supposes rainfall and wet streets to be connected is now lower; i.e., 
his value for c is now smaller. But if he learns instead that the municipal 
street-washing truck has just made its rounds, then, even though he must 
believe more strongly now that the streets are wet, his value for c will 
remain unaltered, as we may imagine.53 We would expect the value of c to 
be related to the value Pn(A ⊃ S) introduced above, and I will in fact argue 
below for equating the two values. This would mean that the degree to 
which the agent non-trivially believes ‘A ⊃ S’ as a result of believing in 
some “connection” between A and S, is simply equatable with the degree 
(or strength) to which the agent thinks that A and S are “connected”. 
On a cursory glance, it might seem that the value of Pn(A ⊃ S) (or, 
equivalently, the agent’s value for c) is just the agent’s value for the 
conditional probability P(S/A). The following example, however, 
demonstrates why an agent should not, in general, equate Pn(A ⊃ S) with 
P(S/A). Suppose that you are in a guava orchard, musing about life on a 
leisurely Sunday afternoon when you feel this irrepressible urge to taste the 
fruit. Wanting a guava to drop down, you consider the material conditional, 
                                                
53 I consider the notion of ‘connection’ between the antecedent and the consequent of a material 
conditional to be intuitively comprehensible; explicating its exact nature is beyond the scope of 
this work. Admittedly, in the example discussed, the connection is of a causal kind; that the notion 
of connection need not, in general, be causal can be seen by considering the material conditional 
‘The streets are wet ⊃ It has been raining’. Naturally, again, our dungeoned information deprived 
agent considers the material conditional to be true to the degree to which he supposes there to be a 
connection between the streets being wet now and it’s raining currently (or, its having rained some 
time on the immediate past). However, the connection can no longer be causal for, the antecedent, 
being later in time to the consequent, cannot cause the latter. 
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‘I scream ⊃ A guava falls from the tree’. Now, knowing what you do about 
guavas and their unresponsiveness to human voices, you, understandably, 
judge there to be a negligible connection between your screaming and any 
guava detaching itself from the tree. Thus, Pn(Scream ⊃ Guava falls) ≈ 0. 
However, knowing also your screaming to be probabilistically independent 
of any guava falling, you know that P(Guava falls /Scream) = P(Guava 
falls). Just as you are, despondently, about to put a low value to the 
conditional probability, you hear a broadcast over the radio informing you 
that a strong gale will now sweep across the orchard. On this basis, you 
judge it likely that a guava will fall; this information does not, however, 
change your degree of belief in the responsiveness of guava to noise and 
therefore leaves unaffected your miniscule value for Pn(Scream ⊃ Guava 
falls). Here, Pn(Scream ⊃ Guava falls) is low, but P(Guava falls /Scream) is 
high. However, even though the general equation of Pn(A ⊃ S) with P(S/A) 
is misguided, there is a numerical link between the concepts which I will 
presently explicate. 
I consider now the second value, PS(A ⊃ S), the degree to which ‘A ⊃ 
S’ is trivially believed as a result of the agent’s belief (to whatever degree) 
that S is true. We can come to understand this notion as follows. One’s 
degree of belief in ‘A ⊃ S’ is surely, to some extent, rendered trivial, owing 
to one’s belief that S is true, but, in any case where one is uncertain whether 
or not A, we must take into account the fact that one believes S to be true 
partly because one believes in a connection between A and S, as well as 
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because one believes in a connection between ~A and S. It is only the 
remainder portion of one’s belief in S, as it were, which is responsible for 
the value PS(A ⊃ S). We can think of this remainder belief as being a belief 
in S which is acquired “independently” of one’s belief in any connection 
between A and S, on the one hand, and between ~A and S, on the other. 
Moreover, an agent can often estimate the strength of this remainder belief 
in terms of a number σ, where 0 ≤ σ ≤ 1, as I now try to show. 
With reference to the guava example, suppose that, on account of the 
news of the impending gale, you judge the “independent chance” of a guava 
falling from the tree to be σ = 0.9. This reflects the strength of your belief 
that a guava will fall anyway, abstracted from the issue of whether or not 
you scream, in the sense that the value of σ is independent of your values 
for Pn(Scream ⊃ Guava falls) and Pn(Don’t scream ⊃ Guava falls), which 
latter value, incidentally, is probably zero. This value of σ = 0.9 for the 
“independent chance” that the guava will fall from the tree is related closely 
to the value PS(A ⊃ S), but should not be regarded as being equal to it, as I 
will explain in a moment.  
Compare another case where, while perusing a credible science 
journal, you chance upon an authoritative study which makes you believe 
that a high noise level in the vicinity, in particular, the sound of a human 
voice, triggers off complex chemical reactions in the cellular material of 
fruit trees which result in a larger possibility of fruit coming unhinged off 
its parent tree. This would force you to revise your value for Pn(Scream ⊃ 
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Guava falls), but it would have, or at least it need have, no effect on your 
value for σ. 
 Similarly, in the rain example, some part of the agent’s degree of 
belief that the streets are wet has its source in his degree of belief that it is 
raining, combined with his values for Pn(Rain ⊃ Streets are wet) and Pn(No 
rain ⊃ Streets are wet). But he may also attribute an “independent chance” 
to the streets being wet, independently, that is, of the two values just 
mentioned, due to a conviction, say, that the municipal street-cleaning truck 
has just done its duty. For example, he may judge the value of this 
“independent chance” to be σ = 1, say, or some number close to 1, 
depending on the nature of the case. With these examples in mind, we have 
some intuitive grasp of the idea of S’s having an “independent chance” of 
being true, relative to any material conditional ‘A ⊃ S’. I will now try to 
explain how I think one’s value for this independence chance, i.e., one’s 
value for σ, is related to one’s value for PS(A ⊃ S). 
Consider the following simple instance of a decision-context of the 
general sort I have promised to analyse. The example is heavily idealised in 
order to bring out the main points sharply. Imagine yourself to be exploring 
some dense African rainforest, when a group of fierce looking aboriginals 
pounce on you. Seeing the malevolent gleam in their eyes and their sinister 
smiles, you almost give up on the fact that you will live, when the leader of 
the group turns up. As luck would have it, this fellow turns out to be 
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compulsively addicted to games of chance and decides to have some 
entertainment at your expense in the following manner. 
You are given a choice between consuming a red pill and a blue pill, 
where, if you decline to choose, the blue pill will be forced upon you. The 
red pill is known to have been drawn at random from a bottle of 100 
identical-looking red pills, 20 of which have the power, each, to kill you 
within a day (if consumed), 70 of which will make you immortal for a day, 
and 10 of which are simply placebos. The blue pill, on the other hand, is 
known to be likewise drawn from a bottle of 100 identical-looking blue pills, 
whose corresponding composition is 40, 25 and 35, respectively. I suggest 
that this information should lead you to adopt the following values54: 
Pn(Red pill ⊃ Death within the day) = 0.2 
Pn(Red pill ⊃ Immortality for a day) = 0.7  
Pn(Blue pill ⊃ Death within the day) = 0.4 
Pn(Blue pill ⊃ Immortality for a day) = 0.25 
Suppose further that, at the time of these events, you also know yourself to 
be infected with Green Congo fever, as a result of a mosquito bite sustained 
not very long ago. The prognosis is grim: you know that, typically, only 
20% of Green Congo infectees survive the first day of their infection. That 
is to say, quite “independently” of this tale of two pills, you already judge 
your “independent chance” of dying within the day as being σ = 0.8. 
                                                
54 On the assumption that c = Pn(A ⊃ S), mentioned previously. 
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 The question is whether you should take the red or the blue pill. To 
grasp how the values above may help you decide, a diagram-based analysis 
is helpful. For simplicity, let: 
A = Consume the red pill 
~A = Consume the blue pill 
S = Die within the day 
~S = Survive the day 
Consider the following display of your “probability space”, relating to your 
decision to consume the red pill (to do A): 
 
                                   1 
 
                            2                          3 
 
 
                                  4 
 
The grey regions 1 and 2 represent the possibility that both A and S obtain, 
while the white regions 3 and 4 represent the possibility that both A and ~S 
obtain. It will turn out that the area of the combined grey region, as a 
fraction of the total probability space depicted, represents the extent to 
which you believe that performing A will “actualise” S, and I will propose 
this value to be equal to your decision-relevant degree of belief in (A ⊃ S). 
 101
The justification of these remarks turns on the meaning of the individual 
regions. 
Regions 1 and 4 of the diagram represent these values of yours: 
Pn(A ⊃ S) = 0.2 
Pn(A ⊃ ~S) = 0.7  
which relate, respectively, to the case where the consumed red pill, 
assuming that it is consumed, turns out to be deadly, or else immortality-
conferring.55 More precisely, the area of region 1, considered as a fraction 
of the entire probability space, is 0.2, whereas the area of region 4, 
considered as a fraction of the entire probability space, is 0.7. The combined 
region 2, 3, on the other hand, relates to the case where the consumed red 
pill turns out to be a placebo, this being the only other possibility. 80% of 
this combined region (i.e., region 2 alone) depicts the chance that you 
thereafter succumb to Green Congo fever, while the remaining 20% (region 
3 alone) depicts the chance that you survive the disease.56 The value of PS(A 
⊃ S) is represented on the diagram by region 2 alone, considered as a 
fraction of the entire probability space. The diagram helps us see that the 
relation between PS(A ⊃ S) and σ is then just as follows: 
PS(A ⊃ S) = σ (1 – Pn(A ⊃ S) – Pn(A ⊃ ~S)) 
In our example, given that σ = 0.8: 
                                                
55 Recall that Pn(A ⊃ S) is your perceived strength of the connection between A and S, based on 
your knowledge of the distribution of the three kinds of red pills in the bottle, and likewise for Pn(A 
⊃ ~S). 
56 If the consumed red pill is not a placebo, then the present statistics concerning Green Congo 
fever (σ = 0.8) become irrelevant, since, as the story is understood, the pill will then either kill you 
or make you immortal, whatever the situation with your fever. 
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PS(A ⊃ S) = 0.08 
I expressed previously that Pn(A ⊃ S) was meant to reflect a belief on the 
part of the agent that doing A will “actualise” S by virtue of a connection 
between A and S, whereas PS(A ⊃ S) was meant to reflect a belief that doing 
A will “actualise” S by accident, or by “independent chance”. This distinction 
is depicted in the diagram by the distinction between the grey regions 1 and 
2, respectively. 
Incidentally, the diagram also makes it clear why Pn(A ⊃ S) cannot in 
general be equated with P(S/A). The value for P(S/A) can be read off the 
diagram as being the combined grey area 1, 2, expressed as a fraction of the 
probability space of A57, whereas Pn(A ⊃ S) corresponds in the same way to 
region 1 alone. So the exact relation between the two is actually this: 
P(S/A) = Pn(A ⊃ S) + PS(A ⊃ S).58 
Following a similar analysis, but this time considering the probability 
space relating to your decision to consume the blue pill (to do ~A), the following 
result may be obtained: 
PS(~A ⊃ S) = σ(1 – Pn(~A ⊃ S) – Pn(~A ⊃ ~S)) 
In the example, Pn(~A ⊃ S) = 0.4, whereas, Pn(~A ⊃ ~S) = 0.25, and so:  
PS(~A ⊃ S) = 0.28.  
                                                
57 By definition, P(S/A) = P(A and S)/P(A), provided P(A) ≠ 0. 
58 I have mentioned that it is easy to confuse P(S/A) with Pn(A ⊃ S). To see this in a normal 
context, ask oneself what value one would put to P(Bush wins the upcoming election/I have pizza 
for dinner tonight). If one’s answer is 0, then one is guilty of this confusion. The value 0 reflects 
one’s judgement that there is no connection between one’s dinner menu and Bush’s political 
future; in other words, 0 is the value for Pn(I have pizza for dinner tonight ⊃ Bush wins the 
upcoming election). One’s value for P(Bush will win the upcoming election/I have pizza for 
dinner) should be equal instead to your (presumably non-zero) value for P(Bush will win the 
upcoming election), since the two events are independent of each other. 
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Likewise: 
P~S(A ⊃ ~S) = 0.02 
P~S(~A ⊃ ~S) = 0.07 
The overall point was to construct a rational decision-making procedure 
based on one’s decision-relevant degree of belief in these four material 
conditionals: 
A ⊃ S 
A ⊃ ~S 
~A ⊃ S 
~A ⊃ ~S 
Letting ‘Pd(A ⊃ S)’ represent, quite generally, the agent’s decision-relevant 
degree of belief in (A ⊃ S), the essential proposal is that: 
Pd(A ⊃ S) = Pn(A ⊃ S) + PS(A ⊃ S) 
where the sum on the right measures the agent’s overall degree of belief that 
A will “actualise” S. The desired decision-making procedure then suggests 
itself of performing an expected utility calculation using, as weights, the 
agent’s decision-relevant degrees of belief in the four material conditionals 
displayed above. 
 Supposing we call this theory Material Decision Theory (MDT), 
then it may be compared with EDT and CDT as follows. As usual, we 
calculate the expected utilities of performing A and ~A, in order to see 
which value (if either) is higher. The values a, b, c, d below represent the 
relevant utility values, as in section 1.7. 
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         EDT 
 
EU(A) = P(S/A) • a + P(~S/A) • c 
EU(~A) = P(S/~A) • b + P(~S/~A) • d 
 
         CDT 
 
EU(A) = P(A □→ S) • a + P(A □→ ~S) • c 
EU(~A) = P(~A □→ S) • b + P(~A □→ ~S) • d 
 
         MDT 
 
EU(A) = Pd(A ⊃ S) • a + Pd(A ⊃ ~S) • c 
EU(~A) = Pd(~A ⊃ S) • b + Pd(~A ⊃ ~S) • d 
 
 
MDT and EDT issue in precisely the same prescriptions for rational action, 
because, as was implicit in the above, Pd(A ⊃ S) = P(S/A), as a general rule. 
However, MDT throws philosophical light on EDT. Appealing to a 
conditional-probability-weighted calculation of expected utility as guidance 
for rational action is legitimate, from the point of view of MDT, because, in 
using a conditional probability, P(S/A), as a weight, the agent is, in fact, 
appealing to his degree of belief that A will “actualise” S because A and S 
are connected, as well as to his degree of belief that A will “actualise” S by 
accident. The conditional probability value is simply a proxy for an agent’s 
decision-relevant degree of belief in an act-state material conditional. 
This justification of EDT forestalls the objection of both Nozick and 
Gibbard & Harper mentioned previously that, in engaging in V-
maximisation (or EDT), the agent is merely maximising the “welcomeness 
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to himself of the news” that he chose to perform the said act. I can concede 
this and still maintain that, though the act prescribed by EDT happens 
indeed to be the act the news of whose performance will make the agent 
most happy, that is not the basis for the agent’s having chosen that act. The 
basis lies rather in the degree to which the agent believes that, in so acting, 
he will “actualise” the desired state of affairs. What Nozick and Gibbard 
and Harper construe to be a fallacious basis for choosing an act is simply 
the natural fallout of choosing the rational act on the grounds detailed above, 
which I propose to be fundamentally sound. 
4.4. Newcomb’s problem in new light 
 Before verifying that MDT recommends taking A alone in 
Newcomb’s original problem, I introduce the following special result which 
will be useful later on:  
PS(A ⊃ S) = P~S(A ⊃ ~S) = 0 
if and only if 
Pn(A ⊃ S) + Pn(A ⊃ ~S) = 1 
The proof for this is simple: 
Proof: 
Since P(S/A) + P(~S/A) = 1, 
Pd(A ⊃ S) + Pd(A ⊃ ~S) = 1 
i.e., Pn(A ⊃ S) + PS(A ⊃ S) + Pn(A ⊃ ~S) + P~S(A ⊃ ~S) = 1. 
Therefore: 
PS(A ⊃ S) + P~S(A ⊃ ~S)  = 0 
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if and only if 
Pn(A ⊃ S) + Pn(A ⊃ ~S) = 1. 
In the rainforest tribe example, it can be verified that if neither the red pill 
nor the blue pill bottle had contained any placebos, then:  
Pn(Red pill ⊃ Die within the day) + Pn(Red pill ⊃ Survive the day) = 1 
Pn(Blue pill ⊃ Die within the day) + Pn(Blue pill ⊃ Survive the day) = 1 
This is also equivalent to saying that: 
Pd(Red pill ⊃ Die within the day) = Pn(Red pill ⊃ Die within the day) 
Pd(Red pill ⊃ Survive the day) = Pn(Red pill ⊃ Survive the day) 
Pd(Blue pill ⊃ Die within the day) = Pn(Blue pill ⊃ Die within the day) 
Pd(Blue pill ⊃ Survive the day) = Pn(Blue pill ⊃ Die within the day) 
So, quite generally: 
Pn(A ⊃ S) + Pn(A ⊃ ~S) = 1 if and only if Pd(A ⊃ S) = Pn(A ⊃ S)  
This is another way of stating the result. 
 Given the discussion so far, I suggest two ways of justifying the 
recommendation to take A alone. In Newcomb’s problem, the following 
conditional probabilities are supposed to be known: 
P(A contains $1M/Take A alone) = k 
P(A contains $0/Take A alone) = 1-k 
P(A contains $1M/Take both) = 1-k 
P(A contains $0/Take both) = k 
where the value of k is close to 1. Strictly speaking, it is not clear whether 
the value of k, as given in Newcomb’s problem (e.g., 0.99) is supposed to 
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relate to the concept P(S/A) or Pn(A ⊃ S), mainly because this distinction is 
not generally made. If we take it in the first way, as is common to do, then 
we may just interpret each of the P(S/A) values above to be the values of 
Pd(A ⊃ S), in which case MDT and EDT will happen to issue in the same 
prescription to take A alone. 
 It is more interesting, however, to construe the value of k in the 
second way. Thus, let us suppose that what is in fact given is this: 
Pn(Take A alone ⊃ A contains $1M) = k 
Pn(Take A alone ⊃ A contains $0) = 1-k 
Pn(Take both ⊃ A contains $1M) = 1-k 
Pn(Take both ⊃ A contains $0) = k 
This would be equivalent to supposing that these equations obtain: 
Pn(Take A alone ⊃ I get $M) + Pn(Take A alone ⊃ I get $0) = 1 
Pn(Take both ⊃ I get $M+$K) + Pn(Take both ⊃ I get $K) = 1. 
But is it reasonable to suppose that they do obtain? I think that it is. Any 
adequate description of the circumstances surrounding Newcomb’s problem 
should tell us not only why the predictor is so good at making his 
predictions but also why he occasionally fails. The following is one such 
account: the predictor is in fact potentially infallible, but every tenth time 
that he looks into an agent’s brain to find out what the agent is going to do, 
he deliberately makes the wrong prediction, just for fun. If you are privy to 
this information, then your perceived strength of the connection between 
taking A alone and getting $M (0.9, in this case), and your perceived 
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strength of the connection between taking A alone and getting nothing (0.1), 
will exhaust the probability space of taking A alone. In other words, there is 
no “gap” in the probability space for any “independent chance process” to 
operate. 
This remains so even if the story is revised such that, every tenth 
time as mentioned above, the predictor tosses a fair coin to make his 
prediction, instead of deliberately making a wrong prediction. This merely 
affects your perceived strength of the two connections mentioned above 
without resulting in the aforesaid gap. (The numbers above are now 0.95 
and 0.05, respectively.) The coin toss is, to be sure, a chance process, but it 
is not an “independent” chance process in the required sense because it 
remains a part of the predictive mechanism. 
In contrast, a genuine gap of the desired sort would exist if the story 
were revised instead as follows: on the average, at random, every tenth 
agent in Newcomb’s problem does not face the predictor at all, but rather 
gets to face The Lord Sutherland of Houndwood, who, in spite of his 
achievements at the Royal Institute of Philosophy, has no predictive ability 
to speak of, and can thus be expected to do no better than chance at 
predicting what the agent will do. In this case, the aforesaid gap occupies 
10% of the relevant probability space, and your value for σ should be 0.5, 
whereas your values for Pn(Take A alone ⊃ I get $M) and Pn(Take A alone 
⊃ I get $0) exhaust merely 90% of that same space, or sum simply to 0.9. 
This would be a genuine case where the two equations above are not 
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satisfied. Since nothing of this nature is part of Newcomb’s original 
problem, we are justified in the supposition made above. 
 Following the special result above, it now follows that:  
Pd(Take A alone ⊃ A contains $1M) = k 
Pd(Take A alone ⊃ A contains $0) = 1-k 
Pd(Take both ⊃ A contains $1M) = 1-k 
Pd(Take both ⊃ A contains $0) = k 
in which case MDT recommends taking A alone if and only if k > 0.5005, 
as we know from a parallel result concerning EDT earlier.
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